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RECONSTRUCTING FORESEEABILITY
W. JONATHAN CARD&
Abstract: This Article is the second of a two-part endeavor assessing the
use of foreseeability in negligence law, and arguing against its ever-
expanding role in the element of duty. The first article, Purging Foresee-
ability, urged courts to adopt the general duty provisions of the pro.
posed Restatement (Third) of Torts—provisions that would purge duty of
foreseeability-based considerations. Courts and scholars have resisted
the Restatement's attempts to rid duty of foreseeability out of a jurispru-
dential view that foreseeability simply "belongs" there. This Article urges
that the conceptual work clone by foreseeability also might fit wholly
and seamlessly within the elements of breach and proximate cause. In
proving that foreseeability's conceptual fit is thus indeterminate, the
Article aims to refocus the debate on whether the court or the jury is
the better arbiter of foreseeability—a matter that courts are reluctant to
discuss and scholars have largely ignored.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of foreseeability is fast devouring the negligence
cause of action. Foreseeability of a risk of injury has for centuries
rested at the heart of cottrt determinations of whether a defendant
breached its duty of care.' More recently, the foreseeability of a par-
ticular plaintiffs injury has become central to the element of proxi-
mate cause. 2 Foreseeability's most aggressive advance of late, however,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1991, Harvard University;
J.D. 1998, University of Iowa. I am much indebted to Professors Mike Green, Ken Kress,
Vincent Cardi, Albert Yvon, and Michael Healy for their gracious contributions. My sin-
cere thanks also to John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, whose correspondence and
conversations sparked the research and thoughts that led to this Article.
' See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 59-60 (2d ed.
2002) (describing the requirement of foreseeability in decisions of breach); 3 Fowt.EB V.
HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, jlt., & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 16.9, at 466-69 (2d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER rr AL, THE LAw OF TORTS] (discussing the history of the
tie between breach and foreseeability).
2 DAN IL Don'ts, THE LAW OF TOR'IS § 180, at 444 (2000); MARC: A. FRANKLIN & ROB-
ER• L. RABIN, TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES 399 (7th ed. 2001). Many identify the emerg-
ing importance of foreseeability in proximate cause decisions with the Australian case,
Overseas Tnnkship (U.K), Ltd. v. Mons Dock Eng'g Co. (The Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 388
(P.C.), although foreseeability had almost certainly played a role in proximate cause for
sonic time before that case.
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has been into the realm of duty. Emboldened by a series of decisions
in the California Supreme Court culminating in Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California,3 foreseeability now threatens to swallow the
duty calculus whole, 4 to become duty's "unified theory."5
This Article is the second phase of a two-part endeavor to assess
the use of foreseeability in negligence law and to make the case
against its expansive role in duty. The first article reviewed foreseeabil-
ity's various doctrinal incarnations and urged courts to adopt the
general duty provisions of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts°—
provisions that would largely purge duty of foreseeability-based con-
siderations. 7 As that piece argued, ridding duty of foreseeability would
result in a number of significant benefits for negligence law. It would
untangle negligence doctrine, which at present is confusingly redun-
dant with regard to foreseeability. 8 It would encourage judges to be
overt about the public policy choices that underlie foreseeability-
based ditty decisions.9 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would
place initial authority over the necessarily fact-dependent issue of
foreseeability properly in the hands of the jury rather than the
judge)°
3 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (holding that among several factors to be considered
in analyzing duty, "[t] he most important of these considerations ... is foreseeability"). For
a discussion of Tarasoff, see infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
4 See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 Al.n. L. REV. 97, 121-23 (1994) (characteriz-
ing Tarasoff as having strengthened foreseeability's predominance in duty decisions);
James P. Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. Itcv. 147, 175-76
(1980) (arguing that beginning with Heaven v. Fender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, and culminat-
ing with Tarasoff, duty analysis has gradually embraced a duty rule turning primarily on an
analysis of foreseeability).
5
 The term "unified theory" is a reference to the search in theoretical physics for a
single umbrella theory that explains the properties and relationships of the entire physical
world. See BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 424 (1999) (defining "unified theory"
as "Ialny theory that describes all four forces and all of matter within a single, all-
encompassing framework").
6 The Section reads: "An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when
the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm." RESTNPEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 7(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004).
7 W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foresecability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 769, 773-74 (2005).
The Restatement (Third's duty approach will, however, only affect negligence cases that
involve physical injury. Negligence cases involving economic or psychic harm are to be
governed by another set of Restatement provisions yet to be drafted. RESTATEMENT
(Thum) OF TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLE-5), at Introduction (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 2002).
Cardi, supra note 7, at 774-87.
Id. at 787-90.
10 Id, at 794, 799-804.
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The arguments in favor of a foreseeability-free duty standard are
largely normative. Despite the merits of such an approach, foresee-
ability remains a pervasive consideration in many courts' duty analy-
ses. There are several possible explanations for foreseeability's popu-
larity. First, judges sometimes find respite in easily comprehensible, if
imperfect, solutions to complex legal dilemmas. Foreseeability pro-
vides such a solution to difficult duty questions—one that is not only
intuitively sensible, but also safely woven into the historical fabric of
common-law negligence. Furthermore, foreseeability has the sound of
doctrine and yet is a malleable enough concept to serve as a vessel
through which courts might render jurisprudentially palatable many
of the policy decisions inherent to tort law." In addition, by infusing
foreseeability into the element of duty—the only element of negli-
gence decided by the court without deference to the jury 12—courts
gain a large measure of control over juries. Much of the doctrinal
work now accomplished by foreseeability as a part of duty has been
traditionally relegated, in the first instance, to the jury in the context
of breach and proximate cause." By co-opting as part of duty
significant portions of the breach and proximate cause inquiries,
courts avoid having to decide such matters pursuant to the "no rea-
sonable jury standard," thereby tightening their reins on the per-
ceived caprice of juries." A final reason for courts' increasing reliance
on foreseeability in deciding duty—and the reason central to this Ar-
ticle—is that many feel that foreseeability simply "belongs there."
That is, courts and scholars often theorize duty such that foreseeabil-
ity is a natural conceptual fit, and they explain foreseeability in ways
that tie it necessarily to duty." This understanding of foreseeability's
relationship with duty can be traced in large measure to the decisions
of Justice Cardozo in such watershed cases as MacPherson v. Buick Mo-
" Id. at 762-67, 787-90; see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negli-
gence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (1993) (suggesting that "judges should not rely on, or hide
behind, words like foreseeable, unforeseeable, ... and whatever other magic mumbo
jumbo courts could use to obfuscate the policies that were really at the heart of their deci-
sions"); Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: De-
scriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VANn. L. REV. 1039,1046 (2001) (describing foresee-
ability as "so open-ended [that] [it] can be used to explain any decision").
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 328B (1965); Doniss, supra note 2, § 149, at
355.
15 Cardi, supra note 7, at 744-50.
n See infra notes 48-76,98-324, and accompanying text.
' 5 Cardi, supra note 7, at 751-52,755-67.
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for Co. 16 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.," although the move-
ment toward this view has almost certainly been broader.I 8
This Article refutes these conceptualizations of duty and foresee-
ability, and it questions the assertion that foreseeability necessarily
plays a role in duty decisions. The Article urges that instead, the con-
ceptual work done by foreseeability also might fit wholly and seam-
lessly within the elements of breach and proximate cause. In proving
that foreseeability's conceptual fit is thus indeterminate, the Article
aims to refocus the debate on the only determinative factor: whether
court or jury is the better arbiter of foreseeability—a matter that
courts are reluctant to discuss and that scholars, at least since Leon
Green, 19 have largely ignored.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a brief overview of
the current doctrinal' roles played by foreseeability in negligence
cases. 20 Part H examines the nature of a "cause of action" generally
and the purpose served by defining a cause of action according to a
series of elements. 21 Part III then addresses the various conceptual
roles played by foreseeability in negligence cases. 22 With regard to
each role save categorical foreseeability (that is, judicial determina-
tions of foreseeability for entire categories of risks or injuries or plain-
tiffs), the subsections of Part III demonstrate that the conceptual
work done by foreseeability might be accomplished equally well in the
context of duty or as part of the breach or proximate cause analyses.
With respect to categorical foreseeability, Part III.D urges that negli-
gence would simply be better off without it. 23 Finally, Part IV summa-
rizes the primary points of the Article and briefly explores a general
statement of duty that might lead courts toward a more lucid under-
standing of the concepts of foreseeability and duty. 24
16 1 1 1 N.E. 1050 (NH 1916).
17 162 N.E. 99 (NH 1928).
11 For a compelling account of this development, see generally John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Ps. L. Ray. 1733 (1998).
19 See generally LEON GREEN. JUDGE & JuRv (1930) (discussing at length the judge ver-
sus jury question in negligence).
20 See infra notes 25-76 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 98-324 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
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I. TUE DOCTRINAL ROLES OF FORESEEABILITY
As background to the discussion in Part III of the conceptual
work accomplished by foreseeability, the following presents a descrip-
tive overview of foreseeability's current doctrinal roles. 25
A. Foreseeability's Role in Breach
Perhaps the most straightforward doctrinal function of foresee-
ability in negligence law is to aid the factfinder in determining
breach. Once the judge has determined that the defendant owed a
duty and has delimited that duty in a standard of care, the jury must
then decide, 26 in the context of breach, whether the defendant's con-
duct failed to conform to that standard. 27 The near-universal standard
of care in negligence cases is the duty to act as would have a reason-
able person under the circumstances." Reasonableness often turns on
(1) the degree of foreseeable likelihood that the defendant's actions
might result in injury," (2) the range in severity of foreseeable inju-
ries, and (3) the benefits and burdens of available precautions or al-
ternative manners of conduct." Together, the range of likelihood and
severity of foreseeable injury constitutes the foreseeable "risk" created
by an actor's conducts' As a general matter, the higher the risk—that
is, the more foreseeable it was that injury might result from particular
behavior and the more severe the range of foreseeable injuries—the
more careful the defendant is required to have been. 32 This form of
23 For a more detailed account, see Card i, supra note 7, at 743-67.
26 I) 0 13 BS , supra note 2, § 115, at 270.
27 W. PAGE KEEJON r.a. AL., PROSSER AND KEI:IoN ON '1111.1 LAW or TORTS § 30, at 164
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or ToRTS § 283 (1965).
2° OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., 	 COMMON LAW 76-77, 86-87 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (1881).
3° See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947)
(enshrining these factors in the mathematical formula in which liability lies where B (bur-
den of precautions) < P (probability of loss) x L {magnitude of loss)); Don'ts, supra note
2, §§ 143-146, at 334-48 (explaining the interplay of foreseeability and reasonableness);
PROSSFIR & KEETON, supra note 27, § 65, at 453-54 ("The unreasonableness of the risk[]
which [a reasonable person of ordinary prudence] incurs is judged by the ... process of
weighing the importance of the interest he is seeking to advance, and the burden of taking
precautions, against the probability and probable gravity of the anticipated harm • „ .").
31 See, e.g., Zettle v. Handy Mfg. Co., 998 F.2(1 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[A] showing of
the magnitude of the foreseeable risks includ [es] the likelihood of occurrence of the type
of accident ... and the severity of injuries sustainable from such an accident.").
32 See, e.g., Lollar v. Poe, 622 So. 2d 902, 905 (Ala. 1993) ("The degree of care required
of an animal owner should be commensurate with the propensities of the particular ani-
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foreseeability is one of general focus. That is, it examines not the
foreseeability of the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff, but the
foreseeable likelihood and severity of injuries that might have resulted
from the defendant's conduct."
B. Foreseeability's Role in Proximate Cause
Once it has been determined that a defendant owed and
breached a duty, and that the breach in fact caused the plaintiffs in-
jury, the jury" must decide what is known as "proximate cause, 1133 "le-
gal cause," s 0
 or, as in the proposed Restatement (Third), the "scope of
liability."37
 This element serves as a limitation on the consequences of
an actor's conduct." Through proximate cause, courts recognize that
although "the consequences of an act go forward to eternity,   any
attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in
infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set society on edge
and fill the courts with endless litigation: 1'39
 Proximate cause thus fo-
cuses on the connection between a defendant's unreasonable conduct
and the plaintiffs injury, 40y and limits liability after the point at which
"the harm that resulted from the defendant's negligence is so clearly
man and with the place where the animals are kept, including its proximity to high-speed
highways."); PROSSER & KErroN, supra note 27, § 31, at 170-71 (explaining that although
"[n]early all human acts, of course, carry some recognizable but remote possibility of
harm to another," precaution is required if the risk is an appreciable one, and the possi-
ble consequences are serious").
33
 See Doans, supra note 2, g 143, at 335. In the context of a discussion of breach,
Dobbs offers the following example:
So if a speeding driver crashes into your living room, the fact that a reason-
able person would not have specifically recognized a risk of harm to living
room furniture will not assist the driver to avoid liability. It is one of the clus-
ter of harms in a generally foreseeable category, and that is enough.
Id.
34
 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 45, at 321.
33 Id. § 41, at 263.
36
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or Tram § 281 (c) (1965) .
37
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Or Towts: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
§ 29, Special Note on Proximate Cause, at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003).
38
 Pitossiat & KErroN, supra note 27, § 41 at 264.
39 Id. § 41, at 264 (quoting North v. Johnson, 59 N.W. 1012, 1012 (Minn. 1894)).
1° Id.; see also Galligan, supra note 11, at 1513 (explaining that proximate cause is
"really a way of deciding whether society ought to hold this defendant, whose negligent
acts were a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs damages, liable under these circumstances, to this
plaintiff ... [or to) sever the chain of causation").
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outside the risks created that it would be unjust or at least impractical
to impose liability.'11
Explanations and tests for proximate cause abound. A common
thread among proximate cause cases, however, is that most explicitly42
or implicitly43 consider some notion of foreseeability." In contrast to
foreseeability's role in breach, the foreseeability inquiry in the con-
text of proximate cause is not general but specific to the particular
injury suffered by the particular plaintiff at hand. Thus, even where
injury of some kind to some perSon was foreseeable, proximate cause
may fail where the defendant's actions resulted in (1) an unforesee-
able type of injury,* (2) injury occurring in an unforeseeable man-
ner,* or (3) injury to an unforeseeable plaintiff. 47 Furthermore, fore-
seeability in the context of proximate cause does not help to decide
whether the defendant acted unreasonably, as in the context of
breach; rather, foreseeability here aids in the decision of whether the
actual consequences of the defendant's conduct were so bizarre or
far-removed from the risks that made the conduct negligent that the
defendant, though blameworthy, should not be held liable for them.
41 DORM, supra note 2, § 180, at 443.
42 See. e.g., Tetro Town of Stratford, 458 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Conn. 1983) ("The test for
finding proximate cause is whether the harm which occurred was of the same general
nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence.'" (quoting Coburn v.
Lenox Homes, Inc., 441 A.2d 620, 627 (Conn. 1982))).
43 For example, the approach of the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts might be de-
scribed as little more than a "foreseeability of type of harm" standard. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 29, cmt. j (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2003). But see John C. P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1332-43 (2003) (suggesting an alternative view of the Restatement
(Third) "risk rule").
44 Donns, supra note 2, § 181, at 444; FRANKLIN & Rattm, supra note 2, at 399.
45 See, e.g., Baltimore City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 79-80 (1883) (holding
that it is within the purview of the jury to decide whether it was foreseeable that a speeding
driver would hit another car, that the collision would bruise its driver, and that the bruise
would later become cancerous); Hines v. Morrow, 236 S.W. 183, 187-88 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921) (holding that it was foreseeable, as a matter of law, that a pothole left by de-
fendant in a highway would stall a car, that a good Samaritan attempting to pull it out
would get his wooden leg stuck in the mud, and that a loop in the tow rope would lasso his
good leg and break it).
46 See, e.g., Bunting v. Hogsett, 21 A. 31, 32 (Pa. 1891) (holding that the injury of a rail-
road passenger was foreseeable, as a matter of law, where a collision threw a railroad en-
gine out of control and the engine then ran around a circular track and struck the passen-
ger in a second collision).
47 See, e.g., In re Guardian Cas. Co., 2 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (holding
the plaintiff was foreseeable, as a matter of law, where a collision forced a taxi into a build-
ing and loosened a stone, which fell and killed the plaintiff, a bystander, while the taxi was
being removed twenty minutes after the initial accident).
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C. Foreseeability's Role in. Duty
In contrast to breach and proximate cause, duty is the province
of the court.48 Courts' analysis of duty is a two-step process. First, the
court must decide whether to impose a duty on the defendant at al1. 49
Second, the court must define the scope of that duty in the form of a
standard of care. 5°
Most courts adhere to a general structure for duty in negligence
cases. The foundation of this structure is the principle that one gen-
erally owes a duty to avoid affirmatively causing physical harm to oth-
ers. 51 The flip side of this universal duty is that one generally does not
owe a duty to warn, protect, or rescue a person from risks created by
another source.52 There are, however, a number of commonly held
exceptions to this "no duty to rescue" rule. These "affirmative duties"
include, for example, the duty to rescue persons with whom one has a
judicially recognized special relationship 53 and the duty to continue,
under some circumstances, a rescue effort voluntarily undertaken. 54
Finally, courts have carved out a number of other special duty rules
that turn either on the nature of the injury alleged or on certain
characteristics of the defendant's identity. For example, a defendant
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 328B (1965); DOERS, supra note 2, § 149, at
355.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 328B.
50 Id.; DoBBs, supra note 2, § 149, at 355.
81 See, e.g., Weirum r. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 1975) ("[Eivery case is gov-
erned by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care
to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct."); Heaven v. Pender,
(1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 ("[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at
once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with re-
gard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the pet-son or property of
the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."); Donns, supra
note 2, § 227, at 578; 3 HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 18.2; PROSSER &
KEEiON, supra note 27, § 53, at 356-59; see also REs .rAmdENT (Thum) OF TORTS: LIAR. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 37, Reporters' Note to cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
4, 2004) (citing a string of cases that recognize the general duty not to create a risk of
harm).
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); DOBBS, supra note 2, § 314, at 853.
83 See, e.g., Methola v. County of Eddy. 629 P.2d 350, 353-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that jailors have a duty to protect and rescue inmates from other abusive in-
mates); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (explaining that Common carriers, inn-
keepers, land possessors, and those in custodial roles owe to customers, invitees, or those
in their custody a duty to protect, warn of dangers, and offer first aid).
84 Generally, a voluntary rescuer must use reasonable care to continue a rescue effort
if failure to do so would leave the rescuee in imminent peril of serious bodily harm. E.g.,
Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 21 P.3d 667, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
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generally (though with significant exceptions) does not owe a ditty to
avoid causing purely emotional or economic harm, 55
 and where the
defendant is a branch of government or a landowner, limited-duty
rules may attach. 56
The conceptual substance of duty is a matter of considerable de-
bate. Generally, duty is seen to be "an obligation, to which the law will
give recognition and effect, to conform to some standard of conduct
toward another."57 Regarding the method by which courts impose and
define legal obligations, their analysis appears to focus on five major
considerations: community notions of obligation,58
 a broad sense of
social policy (including a court's judgments regarding substantive
rights and critical morality), 59 concern for the rule of law, 6° adminis-
trative capability and convenience,61 and, not least of all, foreseeabil-
55 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,916-20 (Cal. 1968) (analyzing emotional harm
rule generally); Don'ts, supra note 2, § 452, at 1282 (discussing the general rule that there
is no duty for negligent economic harm).
58 See Donns, supm note 2, §§ 231-237, at 587-620 (discussing duties commonly owed
by landowners to those on their land); id. § 271, at 723-27 (describing the public duty
doctrine and its limitations on governmental liability).
57 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mimi. L. Rev. 1,12 (1953).
55 See, e.g., Davis v. Westwood Group, 652 N.E.2d 567,569 (Mass. 1995) ("In determin-
ing whether the defendant had a duty to be careful, we look to existing social values and
customs, as well as to appropriate social policy."); John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and
the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324,
1334-35 (1990) (discussing tort law's incorporation of social norms and expectations);
Prosser, supra note 57, at 15 ("In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on
the basis of the mores of the community ....").
59 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 358 (stating that duty is "only an ex-
pression of policy which leacils] the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protec-
don"); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV, L. Rev. 457,466-68 (1897)
(discussing the idea generally).
80 Because duty is the only prima facie element in negligence decided by the court, it
provides judges their primary means of ensuring that like cases are decided alike and dif-
ferent cases differently. Because determinations of negligence are overwhelmingly fact-
specific, however, duty rules most often set general standards rather than particularized
codes of conduct. See Donis, SUM note 2, § 227, at 579 (describing duty decisions as "ex-
pressions of 'global' policy rather than evaluations of specific facts of the case" and ex-
plaining that "no-duty rules should be invoked only when all cases they cover fall substan-
tially within the policy that frees the defendant of liability.... (R]ules of law having the
quality of generality.... should not be merely masks for decisions in particular cases.").
81
 See Prosser, supm note 57, at 15 ("In the decision whether or not there is a duty,
many factors interplay ... [including] the convenience of administration of the rule
...."). For example, the rules governing claims for emotional distress owe their origin to
such concerns. See Galligan, supra note 11, at 1511 (noting that in the context of claims for
emotional distress, "a court may decide there is no duty owed .... (for( administrative
convenience"). Claims for emotional distress pose several unique administrative chal-
lenges: scientific and legal shortcomings in the ability to determine accurately the exis-
tence and extent of emotional harm, the problem of approximating emotional harm in
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ity. Often, foreseeability is cited as a reason to impose a duty where
one otherwise would not exist—for example, due to the rescue rule. G2
Courts also sometimes cite a lack of foreseeability as grounds for deny-
ing a duty, even where the defendant's conduct created a risk of
harm.° Indeed, foreseeability has become so central a concept in
many courts' duty analyses that a ruling on foreseeability is outcome-
determinative . 64
Iii ruling on questions of duty, courts employ each of the doc-
trinal forms of foreseeability also used in deciding breach and proxi-
mate cause 65 Imposition of a duty often turns upon a court's view of
the foreseeability of some risk attendant to the defendant's conduct.°
dollar awards, and the threat of a floodgate of litigation over claims of trivial emotional
injury. See boars, supra note 2, § 302, at 823-24. In response to these challenges, courts
have imposed only limited duties on defendants to avoid causing purely emotional harm.
See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1997) (outlining the
common law's limited duties to avoid causing emotional distress and explaining the policy
reasons for such limitations).
62 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (im-
posing duty on mental health professiOnals to warn foreseeable third parties of dangers
posed by their patients and noting that among several factors to be considered in analyz-
ing duty, "[t]he most important of these considerations ... is foreseeability"); Murdock v.
City of Keene, 623 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1993) (explaining that a jailer may be liable for
injuries sustained from an inmate's suicide attempt if the attempt was foreseeable).
63 See, e.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 187 (N.M. 2003) (Tor our duty
analysis, 'it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff—that he
[or she] was within the zone of danger created by [the defendant's] actions ....'") (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (N.M. 1990)).
64 See, e.g., Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 280 NXS. 862, 868-69 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(finding that a gun manufacturer had no duty and thus was not liable for injuries resulting
from the use of highly charged ammunition, meant only for use in firearms testing and
distributed only to testing parties, because the injured party was an unforeseeable user
who was given the shells by a third party).
68 For a description of the roles of foreseeability in breach and proximate cause, see
supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003) ("All per-
sons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk
of harm. Whether a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to others sufficiently fore-
seeable to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid such conduct is a question of law
....") (citations omitted); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719. 723 (Or. 1979) (stat-
ing that a defendant owes a duty where the defendant "creat[ed] a foreseeable risk of
harm to others"); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)
("In determining whether the defendant was under a duty, the court will consider several
interrelated factors, including the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed
against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. Of all
these factors, foreseeability of the risk is 'the foremost and dominant consideration.'")
(citation omitted) (quoting El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987));
Galligan, supra note 11, at 1511 (noting that some courts hold that "a person has a duty to
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Where injury was not a sufficiently foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's conduct, or where the foreseeable severity of injury was
not particularly great, the judge will dismiss the case on the ground
that the defendant did not owe a duty of care. 67
 The converse is also
true.68 Courts also frequently condition duty on the foreseeability of
the type of harm or the manner in which harm occurred. That is,
even where a court finds that the defendant's conduct created some
risk of harm, the court will decline to impose a duty where the type or
manner of harm was unforeseeable. 69 Finally, as demonstrated by the
famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.," courts also con-
sider the foreseeability of a particular plaintiff to be an important fac-
tor in deciding whether to impose a cluty, 71
One last. introductory observatiOn regarding foreseeability's doc-
trinal place in courts' duty determinations: some courts and academ-
ics explain foreseeability's seemingly redundant roles in duty by urg-
ing that courts decide foreseeability in the context of duty
categorically, whereas they decide foreseeability as part of breach or
proximate cause strictly according to the particular facts of the case.
Pursuant to this view, for example, plaintiff-foreseeability in the duty
context involves asking whether the class or category of persons of
protect another whenever the risk to the other was sufficiently foreseeable that a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise ordinary care to avoid that risk").
67 See, e.g., Albert v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d 895, 898 (Ala. 1992) (holding that the defendant
restaurant owner did not owe a duty to a restaurant patron to protect the patron from the
unforeseeable event of a car backing across a parking lot, over a curb, and through the
wall of the restaurant); Washington v. City of Chi., 720 N.E.2d 1030, 1033-34 (III. 1999)
(holding that where the plaintiff was struck by a truck whose driver had decided to skirt
traffic by driving onto the shoulder, striking a median and planter box installed by the
defendant city, the city had no duty because the accident ... was not a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the condition of the median").
" See, e.g.. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood:Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1048-49 (NJ. 1996)
(holding the severity of harm caused by AIDS to be dire, the possibility that patients might
contract AIDS via contaminated transfusions to be foreseeable, and that the defendant
blood bank thus owed a duty to use reasonable precautions to avoid causing such infec-
tions).
69 See, e.g., Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal Rptr. 2d 291, 295 (Ct. App. 1995) (declining to
impose a duty—where the decedent tow truck driver was killed by a third party while im-
pounding the defendant's vehicle after the defendant's arrest for drunk driving—because
"[tj he harm suffered by decedent... , was not a 'harm of a kind normally to be expected'
as a consequence of negligent driving") (quoting George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 155
Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (Ct. App. 1979)).
7° 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
71 Id. (holding that although railroad workers created some risk in dislodging a pack-
age from the grip of a boarding passenger, they did not create a risk to the plaintiff, who
stood some distance away on the station platform).
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which plaintiff is a member was foreseeable to the category of persons
of which defendant is a member. 72
 To the extent that foreseeability in
duty is indeed decided as a categorical matter—and it is certainly not
uniformly so decided"—such decisions are normatively unwise. As I
have elsewhere argued in greater detail, foreseeability of any doctrinal
stripe is a particularly fact-dependent question, the answer to which
might turn on even slight differences in the facts of a case. 74 Deciding
foreseeability as a categorical matter—for a category of defendants, a
category of injuries, or in the context of a category of risk-creating
activities—is thus nothing more than the announcement of a broad
rule that may not make sense under any number of unforeseen future
circumstances." A categorical decision of foreseeability thus suffers
from the same faults as dictum. There is, however, a different sense in
which a form of categorical foreseeability might provide insight into
certain foreseeability cases. This conceptual use of categorical fore-
seeability, and categorical foreseeability in general, is discussed at
length in Part IILD below."
II. THE PURPOSE OF ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
The foregoing explanation highlights the similar, perhaps over-
lapping doctrinal appearances of foreseeability in the primary ele-
ments of negligence. I have elsewhere argued that the law's redun-
dant use of foreseeability is confusing, illogical, and normatively
undesirable. 77
 Regardless of one's opinion regarding the proper doc-
trinal place of foreseeability, however, it is helpful to consider why the
question of to which element of negligence foreseeability is best
suited is important. More generally; why does it matter that a particu-
lar legal concept is associated with one element of a cause of action or
another? Indeed, what is the purpose of dividing a cause of action
into elements at all?
72 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1818-20,1828.
75
 See generally Mussivand v David, 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989) (in deciding whether
an adulterer owed a duty to the spouse of his adulteress not to transmit to him a sexually
transmitted disease, the court did not speak in terms of a generalized, class-based foresee-
ability, but imposed a duty of due care in light of specific foreseeability-related facts).
74
 Cardi, supra note 7, at 792-93,801-03.
75 Id. at 802.
76 See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
77 See generally Cardi, supra note 7.
2005]	 ReconstmelingForeseeability
	 933
The cause of action is a descendent of the writ system, imported
to colonial America from England." Under the writ system, in order
to survive immediate dismissal, a plaintiff had to allege facts that fit
one of a limited number of particularized forms of proceeding at law
or in equity." Each form of proceeding limited the scope of relief it
provided by requiring distinct. procedural incidents, limiting its appli-
cation to a particular type of factual scenario, offering only a specific
form of remedy, and setting the means of judgment and execittion, 8°
If a plaintiffs pleading failed in any one of these departments, it was
dismissed without regard to the potential that the plaintiff had indeed
been wronged and had suffered injury as a result. 81
Division of the early forms of proceeding into elements provided
a formal means by which to test whether the plaintiff had properly
satisfied the requirements for access to the courts and to a particular
remedy. The cause of action as we know it today is analogous to its
ancestor in the sense that it sets forth the legal requirements accord-
ing to which a plaintiffs suit is judged. It is different, however, in sev-
eral important respects. Today's causes of action are of broader appli-
cability than were the early forms of proceeding—the general
negligence action, for example, has replaced more specific writs such
as trespass on the case. 82 In addition, the chosen cause of action no
longer dictates the remedy available," Indeed, a plaintiff who has
been wronged is no longer limited to existing causes of action for re-
78 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OE AMERICAN LAW 98 (1973) (detailing the
use of English actions by American courts even at the time of the Constitutional Conven-
don); Moterow J. Hottwrt7., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 4
(1977) (describing the adoption of English law by the States); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article
III and the Cause of Action, 89 town 1,. Rtv. 777,784-85 (2004) (explaining the manner in
which early American courts utilized the English forms of action).
79 Bell ia, supra note 78, at 784-85.
88 Sec id. at 784,789.
81 See 1 josEPH Curnw, A TREATISE ON 111E PARTIES TO ACTIONS, THE FORMS OF Ac-
noN, AND ON PLEADING 572 (1828) ("When the declaration appears on the face of it,
and without reference to extrinsic matter to be defective, either in substance or form, the
opposite party may in general demur ...."); JOSEPH STORY, A SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN
CIVIL ACTIONS 23 (2d ed. 1829) (noting that la] mistake of the proper form of action" or
"a defect of form in the count or declaration" was grounds for dismissal); Bellia, supra note
76, at 789.
82 See limtwrrz, supra note 78, at 89-94 (describing the movement from trespass and
trespass on the case to general negligence).
Rs See Baia, supra note 78, at 794-98 (detailing the 1930s debate, culminating in the
drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which divorced the concept of a cause of
action from the existence of a remedy).
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lief at all. 84
 At least ostensibly, a plaintiff need only convince a court
that she has been wronged, and the court is empowered to grant re-
lief. The cause of action is, in this sense, no longer formalistic: a court
is not required to dismiss a plaintiff's claim solely for having failed to
plead the elements of a cause of action. 85
 Lastly, and most saliently,
the elements of a cause of action focus no longer on formalistic hoops
through which a plaintiff must leap, but instead describe the concep-
tual elements of proof of which the plaintiff must convince the judge
or jury in order to prevail. 86
Courts have thus relaxed the formalistic aspects of the forms of
proceeding, adopting instead an approach that focuses directly on the
plaintiff's rights and the defendant's putative wrong. 87 The modern
division of a cause of action into a series of elements serves this ap-
proach in at least three important ways. First, a list of elements guides
the liability inquiry by providing a structured, ordered method ac-
cording to which a court or jury may reason through the substantive
requirements. Because each court follows the same pattern of ele-
ments, such blueprints serve the rule of law by helping to ensure that
like cases will be decided alike. 88
84 See id, at 799 ("[I1t seems clear that today courts conceive of the concept of the
cause of action in more functionally adaptive terms than they did before the merger of law
and equity: a plaintiff may be said to have a cause of action notwithstanding the fact that it
is uncertain upon what legal grounds the plaintiff ultimately will prevail if successful; ...
and the plaintiff may prevail upon a legal theory without either pleading or proving all of
its elements.").
26
 See id. at 792 ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a complaint
set forth in a particular form the facts and events necessary to attain a certain form of re-
lief"); Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 Alkl. JURIS. 179,
182 (2003) ("At first, the legal question raised was whether, on these real facts, the case was
properly brought tinder the pleaded form of action. Inexorably, however, these procedures
invited the litigants to ask the substantive question: on these real facts, should the defen-
dant be held liable?").
86
 Although many cases are still dismissed for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, courts' focus now is not on searching through a
pile of writs for a proper fit, but on determining whether the plaintiffs' facts implicate the
concepts on which substantive justice turns.
87 See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS
§ 347 (4th ed. 1904) (defining a cause of action as "the facts from which the plaintiffs
primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty have arisen, together with
the facts which constitute the defendant's del ict or act of wrong").
88 See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wni. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1594 (2001) ("Cen-
tral to the rule of law is the notion that judicial decision making must be marked by rea-
son, integrity, and consistency."); Neil S. Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis:
Solving the Prisoners' Dilemma Within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1183-84 (2001)
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Second, division of a cause of action into elements facilitates de-
cision makers' analysis of the legal concepts upon which liability rests.
As explained above, the elements of a cause of action typically repre-
sent the legal concepts of which the plaintiff must convince the judge
or jury in order to obtain relief. By considering such concepts dis-
tinctly and in ordered sequence, courts more capably identify the
characteristics of each legal concept, isolate the analysis of each con-
cept from that of others, and determine the relationship between
concepts. These acts, in turn, coalesce courts' understanding of the
prerequisites to liability and lead to a more correct and consistent ap-
plication thereof. For example, courts' understanding that the ele-
ment of duty is distinct from and antecedent to the element of breach
allows courts to parse more carefully those cases in which a defendant
unreasonably failed to rescue another from a risk created by some
third source.89
 As another example, consideration of the relationship
between the concepts of breach and factual causation is a necessary
step in the proper resolution of many toxic tort cases."
Third, setting forth a theory of recovery as a series of elements
provides a useful means by which to segregate issues to be decided by
the court from those left in the first instance to the jury. It is helpful
to consider the proper doctrinal placement of foreseeability in light
of the foregoing discussion. What is the proper home (or homes) for
foreseeability in light of the first purpose, the provision of a struc-
tured analytical blueprint? At one level, the need for an ordered in-
quiry would seem to be met by virtually any logical placement of fore-
seeability. So long as courts have a uniform schematic, they will "build
the same house." Of course, one might argue that the existing multi-
faceted, potentially redundant doctrinal role of foreseeability—even if
ultimately logical—proves confusing to courts and therefore cannot
cultivate the desired methodological consistency. 91 On the other
r[fileplicability, stability, and consistency in application are values that the ideal of the
rule of law is intended to serve,").
89 That is, separate consideration of the concepts of duty and breach ensures in such
cases that the unreasonableness of the defendant's actions does not necessarily lead to an
imposition of legal blame. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d
582, 587-93 (Cal. 1997) (deciding first whether a duty existed pursuant to misfeasance or
nonfeasance before turning to the issue of reasonableness).
9° See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining
that it is not enough that the plaintiff prove that the drug called Danocrine caused the
plaintiff's injury, but that the plaintiff also must prove that it was the defendant's exces-
sive—and hence, wrongful—prescription of Danocrine that caused the injury).
9! See Cardi, supra note 7, at 790-94.
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hand, one might counter that courts' confusion about foreseeability
need not be linked necessarily to structural defects—it may be that
although courts have not yet come around to a consistent understand-
ing of foreseeability's structure, they will eventually. Although I do not
concede the point, this Article proceeds on the assumption of a neu-
tral resolution of this first purpose.
Regarding the second purpose, in which element or elements of
negligence would foreseeability best aid courts' analysis of the legal
concepts on which negligence liability rests? This question is the sub-
ject of Part III and the primary focus of this Article. Part III demon-
strates that although a compelling case can be made that certain con-
ceptual roles of foreseeability fit nicely within the context of duty,
these same concepts fit equally well as part of breach and/or proxi-
mate cause. 92
 Ultimately, this Article asserts that this second purpose is
therefore indeterminate as a means of deciding foreseeability's
proper place in negligence doctrine.
Insofar as these are the most important considerations, if the first
and second purposes are both indeterminate, resolution of foresee-
ability's proper home must lie with the third purpose. The debate
should therefore be resolved by candid discussion as to whether each
of foreseeability's various incarnations would best be decided, in the
first instance, by the court or by the jury. I have elsewhere argued in
favor of the latter," and portions of Part III below supplement this
contention.
Before moving to a discussion of foreseeability's conceptual roles
in negligence, I wish to make one aspect of this inquiry transparent.
Some scholars and courts speak of duty, breach, and proximate cause
as if they exist as a matter of natural law, as if they hang "in the ether"
awaiting our discovery.94
 Those who think about the elements of neg-
ligence from such a vantage often place considerable importance on
the elements' historical development, a development that reflects our
gradual honing-in on the concepts' "true nature." 95
 This natural law-
92 Sec infra notes 98-324 and accompanying text.
95
 Sec Cardi, supra note 7, at 794-804.
94 See generally Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tart Law, 77 IowA L. REV. 449,
477-78 (1992) [hereinafter Perry, Moral Foundations] (suggesting that Ernest Wein•ib views
tort law as "having an essence" or "intrinsic ordering," versus an understanding of tort law
as a "conventional ordering, the constituent elements of which reflect 'the contingencies
of social practice and linguistic usage'") (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort
Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485,496 (1989)).
95
 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCF.PT 1..1F LAw 182 (1961) (describing as a core
value of natural law that "there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discov-
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type view of negligence seems also to lead some to wish for robust
conceptual meaning on the constituent elements of negligence simply
for its own sake. The bias of this Article is rather more pragmatic. The
following analysis works from a presumption that the conceptual
building blocks of negligence spring from the minds of lawyers,
judges, legislators, and academics. They exist simply as a means of
embodying and perhaps formalizing courts' normative choices re-
garding who should be liable to whom and under what circum-
stances. 96
This approach does not deny that tort law has, or is capable of
having, a coherent structure and meaning; hence, the approach does
not embody a form of "reductive instrumentalism."97 It is instrumen-
talist, however, in the sense that it works from the premise that any
feasible structure and meaning of tort law, even if coherent, repre-
sents a set of broad policy choices. For example, the general rule that
one must not act unreasonably to the detriment of another represents
a set of policy choices regarding the circumstances under which we
are willing to coerce the payment of damages. This approach de-
mystifies tort doctrine just enough that we might find a structure and
meaning that more accurately reflects the policy choices that we have
made or wish to make.
Perhaps for this reason, my argument regarding the proper doc-
trinal place for foreseeability is not purely descriptive, but largely
normative. I concede that the approach of many courts is at odds with
my urgings and that the accounts of duty offered by many of my col-
leagues are descriptively accurate. The exposition below thus offers an
alternative approach to duty and to foreseeability.
ery by human reason, with which tnan-made law must conform if it is to be valid"); GEoxo
WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, IIEGEL'S SCIENCE ()F LOGIC 53-59, 107, 431-43, 830-38 (A.V.
Miller trans., 1969) (1812-16) (proposing that laws evolve over time through a dialectic—
with each new thesis an antithesis forms, and the resolution of the conflict between the
two results in a higher state of knowledge of legal truth").
g° SceTarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) ("[Blear
in mind that legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory ex-
pressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage
clone,"); Holmes, supra note 59, at 458 (explaining that "a legal duty so called is nothing
but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to stiffer in this
or that way by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal right").
97 See Benjamin C. ZiptirsIty, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 Mom. L.
REV. 1, 40-42 (1998) (criticizing reductive instrumentalist theories for their failure to pro-
vide complete explanations of tort decisions).
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III. THE CONCEPTUAL ROLES OF FORESEEABILITY
Fart I described the doctrinal types of foreseeability as they ap-
pear in the elements of the negligence cause of action: foreseeability
of risk, foreseeability of type or manner of injury, and foreseeability of
plaintiff.98 Each doctrinal type serves, in its various incarnations, five
conceptual purposes. Foreseeability serves as a constituent of moral
responsibility" and as an instrument of behavioral modification and
economic efficiency.'" Foreseeability also provides a means of limit-
ing the range of consequences for which a defendant will be held li-
ablem and of gauging the merit and extent of court action. 102 Finally,
foreseeability often operates as a proxy for decisions of policy that
have little to do with foreseeability's other conceptual purposes.'"
The following subsections examine foreseeability's various conceptual
roles in negligence in an attempt to reveal that foreseeability might
serve each of these purposes equally well, whether its doctrinal vessel
is duty or the elements of breach or proximate cause.
As an initial matter, it is helpful to consider foreseeability's con-
ceptual purposes in light of the means by which foreseeability gener-
ally must be determined. A brief explanation of this process—drawn
primarily from the insightful work of Stephen Perry104—follows.
"Reasonable foreseeability," as the term is commonly used, is a
function of two separate effects: (I) the objective probability of an
event occurring, and (2) a reasonable person's knowledge and beliefs
about that probability.'" The objective probability that an event will
occur is best understood as the event's relative frequency within a ref-
erence class of events—for example, the relative frequency of a car
crashing when one drives thirty miles per hour over the speed limit.'"
Reasonable foreseeability is not simply a reflection of this objective
98
 See supra notes 25-76 and accompanying text.
99 See infra notes 115-86 and accompanying text.
11)° See infra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
1 ° 1 See infra notes 216-70 and accompanying text.
102 See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 306-24 and accompanying text.
1" The following description is drawn largely from Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for
Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND '11Ik: LAW OF TORTS 72. 97-101
(Gerald Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes]; Stephen R.
Perry, Risk, Harm and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF Toni LAW 321,
322-29 (David Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter Perry, Risk, Harm and Responsibility]. Perry's
account in turn draws upon the work of Clarence Morris, Michael Moore, H.L.A. Hart,
and Tony Honore.
105 Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 97.
106 Id.
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probability, however. Rather, foreseeability measures the fragment of
objective probability that a reasonable person could have or should
have—depending on the context of the decision—foreseen under the
circumstances. 107 Thus, foreseeability is often referred to as epistemic
(or knowable) probability."
The determination of foreseeability requires two levels of judg-
ment. First, the relevant decisionmaker must properly describe the
subject event and frame that event within its proper reference class of
events." Continuing the example from the prior paragraph, an event
might be described as "injury," "injury from a car crash," "shattered
pelvis from a car crash," or "shattered pelvis from a car crashing into a
tree." The spectrum of possible descriptions, from general to specific,
is quite broad. Similarly, the reference class of events might be de-
scribed as "while driving," "while speeding," "while driving thirty miles
over the speed limit," "while driving thirty miles over the speed limit
on a rainy day," or any number of other possible variations. One's
choice of description of the event and of the reference class of events
strongly influences the event's relative frequency (and likely its epis-
temic probability). For example, the relative frequency of an injury
occurring while driving thirty miles over the speed limit on a rainy day
is undoubtedly higher than that of suffering a shattered pelvis from
crashing one's car into a tree while driving. Yet the law provides no
guide for determining the appropriate breadth of description.' 10
H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore have proposed that the indeterminacy
associated with such decisions is lessened, across a wide range of cases,
I" See id, Whether "could have" or "should have" is the proper condition depends on
the context of the foreseeability inquiry. See infra notes 140-95 and accompanying text
(distinguishing the two inquiries).
108 Perry, Risk, Harm and Responsibility, supra note 109, at 322.
loPerry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra nate 104, at 98; see also Wein rib, supra note 94,
at 521 (explaining that creating a link between the defendant's action and the plaintiff's
suffering requires "viewing the plaintiff's suffering from the standpoint of an appropriately
general description of the risk created by the defendant").
110 Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 109, at 98-99. Indeed, as Ernest Weinrib
explains:
The most that the courts can accomplish through abstract prescription is
point out that foreseeability of the precise concatenation of events' is irrele-
rant, while also cautioning against setting up excessively broad tests of liabil-
ity. The description of the risk can be formulated only case by case in terms of
what is plausible in any given fact situation as compared with analogous fact
situations.
Weinrib, supra note 94, at 523.
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by the "common knowledge of ordinary persons" who make them."
Nonetheless, some level of indeterminacy remains.
According to Hart and Honore, this same "common knowledge of
ordinary persons" also shapes the second judgment. necessary to de-
termine foreseeability. Once the decisionmaker frames the relevant
event within a reference class of events, it must then gauge the event's
epistemic probability. 112 Again, in so doing, the decisionmaker is not
attempting to uncover the event's objective probability (although reve-
lation of such a fact might influence the decisionmaker's thought pro-
cess), but rather to decide what an ordinary person could have or
should have foreseen under the circumstances.'" As I explain more
thoroughly in Part ILIA, this decision is part fact-finding—determining
what the ordinary person would foresee under these circumstances—
and part philosophical exercise—deciding what level of epistemic
probability should open the door to liability.'"
This two-part reasoning plays some role in decisions regarding
foreseeability regardless of the conceptual purpose of such decisions
and no matter their doctrinal context. I now turn to an examination
of the five primary conceptual purposes served by foreseeability.
A. Foreseeability as a Constituent of Moral Responsibility
Each element of negligence reflects, in some respect, a dimen-
sion of blameworthiness. The element of breach is commonly thought
to be the chief instrument in this regard.'" Even where a defendant
acted unreasonably, however, such dangerous conduct is not deemed
blameworthy unless the defendant owed a duty to have acted rea-
sonably. 116 Furthermore, even where a defendant unreasonably de-
faulted on an obligation of care, one cannot blame a plaintiff's injury
on the default without proof of a causal connection between the
In Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 100-01 (citing H.L.A. HART &
TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN 'HIE LAW (2d ed. 1985); Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence,
and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. Rtv. 189 (1952)).
112-PCITy, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 100.
113 See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND '111E LAW 94 (1999)
("[Floresight is neither a matter of what is in fact foreseen nor of what could ideally be
foreseen. Instead, it is a matter of what a reasonable person would foresee.").
1 " See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
us sec e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 85, at 608 (discussing fault as the basis
for compensation); Weinrib, supra note 94, at 517-19 (analyzing the role of fault in negli-
gence).
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 282 (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, so pro note 27,
§ 30, at 164.
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two.'" Proximate cause might also be described in terms of blame:
although a defendant's unreasonable conduct may have caused the
plaintiff's injury, other factors—the passage of time, the conduct of
others, serendipity—might play such a significant part in causing the
injury that the defendant's role seems insignificant and therefore not
blameworthy. Alternatively, proximate cause might stand for the
proposition that a defendant may be blamed only for those injuries
the risk of which made the defendant's conduct wrongful." 8
A series of scholars have sought to explain the imposition of
blame in tort law in moral terms and to justify the circumstances un-
der which moral responsibility, in the form of legal liability, arises. 119
The most prominent form of this pursuit, known as corrective justice
theory, views tort liability solely as a matter of justice between the par-
ties to an action, without regard to law's capacity as a distributive
force, maximizer of societal wealth, or other social instrument. 128 Al-
though corrective justice encompasses a variety of approaches, recent
scholarship on fault-based tort liability has focused largely on the the-
ory of outcome-responsibility first proposed by Tony Honore. 121
Generally, outcome-responsibility proposes a moral link between
conduct and the injury caused by it. It describes a set of circumstances
under which a defendant can be said to be morally responsible for the
consequences of his or her conduct. 122 According to Honore, this link
117 See ERNESTI. WEINRIB,	 ii)EA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-144 (1995) (explaining that if
a defendant's conduct results in harm to another, the defendant owes a moral duty to
compensate the plaintiff for such harm). See generally Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STun. 151 (1973) (proposing the same as a unitary theory of tort liabil-
ity).
118 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) or TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINC:i
PIES) § 29 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003) ("An actor is not liable for harm different from
the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious."); RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at 69
("Those who fail to exercise appropriate care with respect to particular risks act at their
peril with inspect to those risks.").
119
 Aristotle is the earliest western philosopher associated with this pursuit. See fames
Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW, supra note 104, at 131. Sec generally 5 ArtisTort.E, THE NICOMACHFIAN ETHICS 142-49
(J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987).
120 Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAw AND LEc.m.
THEORY 57, 72 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Perry, Tort Law].
121 See generally Tony Honore, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L. Q. Rr.v. 530 (1988). For a
revealing discussion of ilonore's theory, see Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 94, at
489-96.
122 Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 75; MC also Stephen R. Perry, The Distribution Turn:
Mischief Misfortune and Tort Law, 16 Q.L.R. 315, 326-27 (1996) [hereinafter Perry, The
Distribution Turn] (arguing that fault without outcome-responsibility does not justify forced
compensation, but instead might be satisfied by punishment alone).
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is established simply when one person's act causes harm to another. 123
His reasoning is as follows. Each of us has a choice whether or not to
act in the world, 124 or at least regarding which of any number of acts
we will undertake. 125 This ability to choose is commonly described as
one's capacity for "agency: "12626 Every act necessarily entails some
risk. 127 In freely choosing one act over another, au actor makes an im-
plicit gamble that the payoff of that act will outweigh its potential
cost. 128 The outcome of this gamble is thus an expression of the ac-
tor's agency, 129 and the gamble's outcome is credited (or discredited)
to the agent in a kind of "social ledger:150 This social ledger serves as
the moral basis for legal liability."'
As many have pointed out, however, what has come to be known
as the libertarian account of outcome-responsibility is wanting in two
important respects. First, it fails as a normative matter to distinguish
between plaintiff and defendant, each of whose actions necessarily led
t" See Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 94, at 499 ("[T] he essential characteristic of
outcome-responsibility is the fact of having voluntarily performed an action or actions that
causally contributed to the outcome in question.").
"4 Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 76.
125 One might argue that in fact we do not have a choice but to act in the world. Living
is acting; even if one chooses to sit unmoving as a Jainist monk, one has chosen that act
over other alternatives. See HOLMES, supra note 29, at 77 CA man need not, it is true, do
this or that act,—the term act implies a choice,—but he must act somehow.").
126 Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 94, at 489-90.
127 Others have also made this point. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEE.TON, supra note 27, § 31,
at 170 ("Nearly all human acts, of course, carry some recognizable but remote possibility
of harm to another."); Ernest .). Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 Gomm° L.
REV. 1283,1305 (1989) (stating that "risk is an unavoidable concomitant of all action").
128 Honore, supra note 121, at 539.
129
 RIPS'EEIN, supra note 113, at 98.
Igo Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 94, at 489; sec also RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at
97-98 ("Honore argues that in a world of risk, every action involves an implicit gamble.
How those various gambles turn out is constitutive of a person's agency.... When things
go well, the credit redounds to us. When they turn out badly, we are responsible for the
bad results."); Honore„ supra note 121, at 539-40 (noting that in deciding to do X instead
of Y, we are choosing to put our money on X and its outcome rather than Y and its out-
come" and that although we receive credit if the bet turns out well, "if we botch it, ... that
is chalked up against us"); Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 76 (1 have a choice about
whether to become active in the world, and if I choose activity over passivity then all subse-
quent consequences, both good and bad, are appropriately chalked up to my moral ledger
and no one else's.") (emphasis omitted).
151 This conclusion rests, in part, on the normative, libertarian claim that forced redis-
tribution is illegitimate and that it is unfair to hold a person responsible for costs imposed
by another. Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 76.
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to the relevant injury."2 For example, where A drives into B's parked
car, both A's act in driving and B's act in parking the car caused the
collision—according to the libertarian view, both A and B are out-
come-responsible for the accident. 133 This approach leaves courts
without guidance on how to allocate liability between causal elements.
Second, even if courts were to find principled grounds by which to
allocate liability, the libertarian view ultimately leads to a system of
general strict liability,'" and thus fails to justify our largely fault-based
system. For these two reasons, the concepts of action and causation
have proven to be necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions for out-
come-responsibility."8
Stephen Perry has led the way in developing an account of out-
come-responsibility that justifies both strict and fault-based liability.
According to Perry, outcome-responsibility depends on the notion of
control. Only an agent who is in control of his or her actions and, to a
certain degree, of the consequences of those actions, may be said to
be outcome-responsible.'" According to Perry, the necessary degree
of control over the outcome is defined by whether the outcome was
avoidable, and avoidability exists only in the presence of a "general
capacity on the part of an agent to foresee an outcome and to take
steps to avoid its occurrence." 07 Foreseeability, or at least a "general
capacity to foresee," thus enters the outcome-responsibility calculus. 138
Perry explains:
132
 Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 94, at 463; sec also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960) (arguing that tort injury is not caused by one
party alone, but rather is caused by the interaction of the acts of both parties to an action).
133 Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 94, at 463.
"4 Id; see also Epstein, supra note 117, at 157-60 (justifying his proposal for general
strict liability on libertarian grounds).
135
 An interesting consequence of this reasoning is that tort liability based upon viola-
tion of an affirmative duty would seem not to be an instance of outcome-responsibility. See
Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 125 n.34 ("[TI he breach of an
affirmative duty typically gives rise to non-causal liability and should not, therefore, be
regarded as an instance of outcome-responsibility."). I discuss the import of this realization
in Part III.D below.
135 See id. at 82 ("Outcome-responsibility	 , like most other responsibility concepts,
... involves a notion of control.... Outcome-responsibility assumes that the agent had
control of his action of the kind posited by action-responsibility, but it also assumes that he
had control over the outcome itself."); sec also RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at 53 ("The idea of
responsibility thus carries with it an idea of responsible agency. In order to be a responsi-
ble agent, one nmst be able both to pursue one's own ends and to moderate one's claims
in light of the legitimate claims of others.").
137 Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 73.
"8 See id.
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Suppose A engages in an activity that results in foreseeable
harm to B. Because the harm was foreseeable, A had it
within his power to avoid causing it; even if there were no
precautions he could have taken to reduce the risk, he could
have forgone the activity altogether. He thus had a certain
measure of control over the situation, and ... it seems rea-
sonable to ascribe to him a special responsibility for the out-
come that, in general, other persons do not have.'"
Outcome-responsibility, according to Perry, thus consists of (1)
an act (2) that caused injury (3) committed by a person who had the
general capacity to foresee and avoid causing such injury. 140 Outcome_
responsibility alone, however, is an insufficient justification for forcing
compensation for an injury, but it serves, rather, as a basis for such an
obligation."' Even if a defendant could have avoided causing an in-
jury, it does not necessarily follow that the defendant should have
done so. 142 For the final link in the normative connection between an
agent's act and the harm it caused, Perry looks to the concept of
fault. 143 Only when an avoidable risk should have been avoided—that
is, when the agent's conduct was faulty—does outcome-responsibility
ripen into an obligation to compensate. 144 Perry suggests that fore-
seeability plays a role in gauging fault as well, although perhaps fore-
seeability of a different sort and serving a different purpose than that
ascribed to outcome-responsibility. Foreseeability informs outcome-
155 Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 76-77; see also RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at 95
(noting that according to Perry, "foresight is relevant to liability because an agent is only
morally responsible for things that he or she can foresee").
14° See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 92 ("The normative power of
this conception of outcome-responsibility resides in the idea that the exercise of a person's
positive agency, under circumstances in which a harmful outcome could have been fore-
seen and avoided, leads us to regard her as the author of the outcome.... The agent acted
and caused harm under circumstances in which she had a sufficient degree of control to
avoid its occurrence, and for that reason she has a special responsibility for the outcome
that other persons do not have.").
141 Id. at 73.
142 Id. at 91; Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 77.
14  See Perry, The Distribution Turn, supra note 122, at 334 (IA] moral obligation to
compensate, of a kind that was enforceable in tort law, rests on two main foundations: first,
a pre-political moral responsibility for those outcomes of our actions that we have the ca-
pacity to foresee and avoid; and second, an objective fault standard, shaped by liberal con-
ceptions of fairness and autonomy, that determines which risks may and which may not be
imposed on others.").
144 See Perry, Tort Law, supra note 120, at 77 (if ... a risk was not only foreseeable but
should have been avoided, it seems appropriate to conclude that outcome-responsibility
takes the form of an obligation to compensate.").
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responsibility by indicating avoidability—if an actor was generally ca-
pable of foreseeing an outcome, the actor could have avoided it. Fore-
seeability informs fault by indicating reasonableness—if the epistemic
probability of an outcome was high enough, perhaps the actor should
have avoided it. 145 I will refer to his latter incarnation of foreseeability
as "normative foreseeability."
Perry is clear that at least as a positive matter, outcome-
responsibility is the stuff of duty in negligence, and fault is the essence
of breach."6 This approach makes some intuitive sense. It seems right
to say that if one is responsible for an outcome, one therefore owes a
duty to have acted reasonably in bringing it about. Stated in terms of
foreseeability, when one is capable of foreseeing and avoiding an out-
come, one owes a duty to have acted reasonably in foreseeing and
avoiding it. Assuming that Perry's overall justification for negligence
liability is correct, however, whether it commands a role for foreseeability
in duty is another matter. Might outcome-responsibility still accurately
describe and justify negligence liability were courts to purge duty of
considerations of foreseeability?
An answer to this question begins with the observation—to which
Perry concedes—that as a positive account of duty, outcome-respon
sibility is incomplete. It does not explain courts' refusal to impose a duty
due to any number of consequentialist policy considerations 147—for ex-
145 See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 105 (11] t is only by referring
to ... a cost-benefit analysis that we can say whether or not a given type of harm is rea-
sonably foreseeable, i.e., whether or not it should be foreseen. Thus the notion of reason-
able foreseeability inevitably involves snore than the general capacity to foresee that I have
been describing. It also involves reference to action-guiding norms of the kind that figure
in the Learned Hand Test."); see also IttivrEiN, supra note 113, at 105 (explaining that in
the context of judging fault, "consequences are foreseeable if a person showing appropri-
ate regard for the interests of others would have taken them into account").
146 Sec Perry, The Distribution Turn, supra note 122, at 326 ("On its face, however, a fault
standard tells us nothing about when, or even whether, misfortune should be shifted from
one person to another. What it tells us, rather, is how we should behave towards one an-
other; it tells us to conduct our activities with reasonable care, or to take precautions when
B < PL, or whatever.") (emphasis omitted); Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note
104, at 95 (explaining that outcome-responsibility, and the foreseeability component of
that, are questions of duty, for the court to decide); id. at 116 Mit the absence of out-
come-responsibility, all we have in fault is the violation of a norm.... RINE if this is not
systematically related to and constrained by a requirement of outcome-responsibility (as
embodied in the defendant's duty of care), then there is nothing to distinguish this par-
ticular norm of conduct from any other.").
147 Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 95 n.34.
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ample, a concern for sweeping liability"8
 or the desire to protect ac-
cepted social institutions." 9
 Nor does outcome-responsibility justify or
explain either the imposition of a duty in cases of nonfeasanc0 8° or
courts' limitation of one's duty to avoid causing emotional or economic
injury's'—decisions that might turn on concerns other than foresetabil-
ity. 182
 The fact that duty turns on non-foreseeability-related factors in
some cases suggests the possibility that duty, at its core, turns on non-
foreseeability-related factors in all cases.'" Such an explanation of duty
need not rob outcome-responsibility of its justificatory or even its ex-
planatory power, however. Negligence, in relevant part, might be de-
scribed as follows: if one owed a duty of care (determined solely, for ex-
ample, by reference to community notions of obligation, policy
considerations, a concern for the rule of law, and administrative conven-
ience), 154
 then one will have breached that duty if (1) one was generally
capable of foreseeing the injury and avoiding it, and (2) one should
have foreseen and avoided it. Just as it seems right to say that if one is
capable of foreseeing and avoiding an outcome, one owes a duty to have
acted reasonably in foreseeing and avoiding it (Perry's approach), it
also seems intuitive to say that one who is incapable of foresight gener-
ally cannot have acted unreasonably in failing to foresee and avoid caus-
ing injury. Neither explanation, at this basic level, is normatively supe-
rior, A closer look at foreseeability's part in outcome-responsibility
supports this initial conclusion.
148
 See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (limiting the li-
ability of a public utility for gross negligence in causing a power outage because sweeping
liability might lead to the utility's insolvency).
148 See. e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984) (recognizing that many
courts do not impose a duty in cases of social host liability because of the concern that
such duties would Interfere with accepted standards of social behavior; [and] ... intrude
on and somewhat diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and camaraderie that accompany
social gatherings at which alcohol is served"); Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707
(Ohio 1990) (declining to impose a duty where a golfer had been struck in the head by an
errant ball because liability "might well stifle the rewards of athletic competition").
150
 Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 95 n.34.
151
 See id.
152
 That affirmative duty cases turn on factors other than foreseeability is a matter dis-
cussed in Part 111.0 below. See infra notes 295-305 and accompanying text. Recitation of
some of the policy considerations that underlie economic harm cases may be found supra
note 318, and emotional harm cases may be found infra note 61.
155
 Most existing theories of duty purport to be descriptive and so include foreseeabil-
ity in some manner. Although it is not the mandate of this Article to propose a foreseeabil-
ity-free substantive duty theory, Part IV sketches the beginnings of such an approach.
154 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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Outcome-responsibility is dependent upon an actor's "general
capacity to foresee." 155 By this, Perry refers at least in part to the sub-
jective characteristics of the actor.---for example, whether the actor
has an IQ sufficient to facilitate a general minimum capacity to fore-
see injury, or whether the actor's age and mental health are similarly
stifficient. 156
 Were this Perry's only benchmark for judging capacity,
this narrow query perhaps would fit best within the concept of duty. 157
As a matter of policy and commonly-held notions of obligation, a
court might well wish to set a minimmn physical and mental capacity
for foresight below which an actor cannot be said to owe a duty of rea-
sonable care at all.'" The prescription of such bright-line rules seems
quintessentially the mandate of duty. 159
Thus understood, however, judgments regarding an actor's gen-
eral capacity to foresee would not constitute decisions of "foreseeabil-
ity" at all, at least not as that term is commonly used in the law of negli-
gence. Inquiries into foreseeability presume an acceptable capacity to
foresee and ask whether the relevant risk, injury, or plaintiff was fore-
155 See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 73.
158 See id. at 103 ("Mhe capacities to foresee and avoid harmful outcomes are appro-
priately understood as general abilities that the individual who caused a given harm ordi-
narily succeeds in exercising in other, similar situations.... It is in this sense that the
avoidability-based conception of outcome-responsibility treats the capacities to foresee and
avoid harm as subjective."). Perry further notes that "a plausible non-consequentialist the-
ory of tort law must suppose that mental disorders serious enough to undermine the ca-
pacity to foresee and avoid harm should excuse the defendant from liability." Id. at 106.
Perry also cites, for this proposition, H.L.A. Hart's capacity/opportunity principle:
"[W]hat is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the
normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and abstaining
from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise those capacities." Id. at 88 (quoting
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN 'ME PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 152
(1968)).
157
 See Perry, The Disfribution Turn, supra note 122, at 320 ("If I were riot an agent, 1
would not be the sort of entity that could even owe a duty.").
158
 Of course, a court might also hold that a person of a certain age or mental ability
cannot be deemed to have breached a duty of care.
155
 In fact, courts have generally declined to alter the duty owed by those of impaired
mental capacity, Kelley, supra note 85, at 231; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2838
(1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve
the actor from liability for conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reason-
able man under like circumstances."). By contrast, courts often delimit the age at which a
person gains meaningful agency; below that tige, an actor is held either to owe no duty at
all or to owe a duty of care keyed to the reasonable child of the actor's age. See, e.g., Maska-
Unitas v. Chi. & W.I.R. Co., 149 N.E. 23, 26 (111. 1925) (holding that children under the age
of seven are presumed to be incapable of negligence); Cox v. Hugo, 329 13.2d 467, 969
(Wash. 1958) (holding same for children under the age of six); Kelley, supra note 85, at
239-40 (explaining courts' general unwillingness to impose a negligence duty on children
tinder a certain age).
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seeable by a hypothetical reasonable person in the actor's shoes. 16° The
aspect of general capacity described above, by contrast, is divorced from
the facts of the case. It does not ask whether the relevant risk, injury; or
plaintiff was foreseeable under the circumstances. Nor does it even ex-
amine whether a certain category of risk, injury; or plaintiff was fore-
seeable to a category of actor. Such an analysis instead focuses solely on
the physical and mental traits of the actor, on whether the actor pos-
sesses some minimum mental ability to foresee the consequences of his
or her actions. In this sense, this aspect of the general capacity inquiry
is akin to a competency hearing in a criminal case. Thus, even if this
aspect of the general capacity to foresee were to fit more comfortably in
duty than in breach, such a conclusion would do little to advance analy-
sis of the proper doctrinal home for foreseeability.
Perry's conception of the "general capacity to foresee" cannot
possibly stop at an actor's subjective characteristics, however. It would
be illogical to refer to an actor as "outcome-responsible"—even when
the actor enjoys some minimum general capacity for foresight—if not
even a person of ordinary capacity could have foreseen the relevant
outcome. Perry's conception of capacity thus includes an objective as
well as a subjective component, and it considers not one's capacity to
foresee in the abstract, but one's capacity to foresee a category of
events that fits the facts of the case. Specifically, Perry's capacity in-
quiry proceeds as follows. First, the decisionmaker must divine the
actor's subjective capacity to foresee outcomes of the same general
sort as the outcome at hand.m (The proper description of this subject
category, as explained in the introduction to this section, is deter-
mined according to the "common knowledge of the ordinary per-
son.") 162
 Second, the decisionmaker must compare the actor's subjec-
tive capacity in this regard to the minimum "degree of capacity
regularly exercised by ordinary or average people who strike us as
possessing meaningful agency."'" If the actor's subjective capacity to
166
 Whether outcome-responsibility depends on the foresight of the actor or a hypo-
thetical reasonable person is a matter discussed below. See infra notes 161-64 and accom-
panying text.
161 See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 103 ("[C]apacities to foresee
and avoid harmful outcomes are appropriately understood as general abilities that the indi-
vidual who caused a given harm ordinarily succeeds in exercising in other, similar situa-
tions.").
162 Sec supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
' 63 Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 103-04. A broader quotation
might be helpful:
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foresee such outcomes meets (or exceeds) this objective minimum
standard, the actor's general capaCity to foresee is sufficient to sup-
port a conclusion that the actor is outcome-responsible.'"
This explanation of the general capacity to foresee brings the
concept more squarely in line with courts' common understanding of
foreseeability. Still, Perry's account does not require that its resolution
occur in the context of duty. The closest Perry comes to such an ar-
gument is his emphasis on the distinction between foreseeability's
role in outcome-responsibility and its role in reasonableness. There is
some aesthetic appeal to the proposition that as a prerequisite to
normative foreseeability and breach, one's general capacity to foresee
should be resolved separately, as a part of duty. Aside from aesthetics,
however, there is no practical reason that the constituents of outcome-
responsibility need remain a unit or that they must remain segregated
from other phases of the liability inquiry. The distinction between the
general capacity to foresee and normative foreseeability would remain
meaningful even if they were to exist as sequential steps in an analysis
of breach. In such a case, the breach inquiry would ask (in relevant
part) first whether the actor could have foreseen and avoided the out-
come, and second whether the actor should have done so. 165
Some people can foresee possible future outcomes more often than others,
and some are sufficiently out of touch with reality that they possess only the
most minimal capacity to predict the consequences of their actions. A line has
to be drawn to determine what degree of the capacity a person must possess
before he or she is capable of being outcome-responsible at all.... That, in
turn, seems inevitably to require looking ... to the degree of capacity regu-
larly exercised by ordinary or average people who strike us as possessing
meaningful agency.
Id.
164 See id. at 104 ("The capacity consists in being able to foresee and avoid outcomes in
various sorts of circumstances on a sufficiently regular basis, where what counts as a
sufficient degree of regular success is determined by the idealized conception of the ordi-
nary person."). If outcome-responsible, however, an actor is then—for the purpose of de-
termining the reasonableness of her conduct—deemed to have the capacity to foresee
enjoyed by the ordinary person. Sec id. ("[API those who meet the minimum standard are
treated as having an equal capacity to foresee and avoid outcomes, and hence are subject
in an equal degree to being held responsible for the consequences of their actions.").
'rims, although the standard for whether an actor could foresee injury is at least partly sub-
jective, the standard for whether an actor should foresee injury is completely objective.
165 Of course, as a practical matter, the question of whether an outcome could have
been foreseen might well be subsumed in the decision-making process by the question of
whether it should have been foreseen. Such a result would not pose a problem, however—
the latter finding is outcome-determinative in any case.
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By analogy, consideration of the means available to an actor to
avoid an outcome is, in fact, traditionally considered to be a constitu-
ent of reasonableness. Suppose that a plaintiff, struck by the defen-
dant's car, were to argue that the collision would have been avoided
had the defendant performed a reverse 180° slide (a professional
stunt-driving maneuver). The reasonableness of the defendant's fail-
ure to perform such a maneuver would depend on (1) whether it is
within the capacity of the reasonable person to have clone so generally
and, if so, (2) whether a reasonable person should have done so tin-
der the circumstances. Both considerations are clearly matters within
the scope of the jury's resolution of breach. Perry's analysis of an ac-
tor's general capacity to foresee is analogous to (1) and therefore
similarly might fit within a jury's reasonableness inquiry. 166 Put in
terms amenable to Judge Learned Hand (where negligence exists if B
< P x L), 167
 if an outcome was in no meaningful way foreseeable be-
cause the actor was incapable of foresight, then not only would the
epistemic probability of the outcome (P) be zero, but the actor's bur-
den in preventing it (B) would be almost immeasurably great. To hold
one responsible for failing to avoid an unforeseeable outcome would
be to place one in charge of serendipity. In sum, negligence works
properly whether the general capacity to foresee is a part of duty or a
part of breach.
Embracing Perry's concept of the general capacity to foresee as a
constituent of breach rather than duty would require no sacrifice of
outcome-responsibility or of reasonableness. Thus, the more compel-
ling reason to keep the two inquiries doctrinally separate would be a
conclusion that the court should decide the former and a jury the lat-
ter. At least by implication, Perry sheds some light on this matter as
well, although to see this one must understand Perry's answer to the
following question: at what level of epistemic probability is an ordinary
person deemed minimally capable of foreseeing a type of outcome? It
is a tautology to say that if the epistemic probability of an event occur-
ring is greater than zero, the ordinary person is capable of foreseeing
it. Yet if this were the test for judging one's capacity to foresee, the in-
166
 One might point out that the capacity to avoid the crash is judged pursuant to a
completely objective standard, whereas Perry's capacity to foresee inquiry is in part subjec-
tive. This difference is unproblematic, however. There is no reason that a fact-specific sub-
jective inquiry cannot take place within the context of reasonableness. Indeed, a fact-
specific inquiry into an actor's subjective characteristics is squarely within the jury's man-
date to decide breach.
167
 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947).
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quiry would lose much of its probative value because almost any out
 is, by some stretch of the imagination, foreseeable.' 6H (This is es-
pecially true considering that judgments of foreseeability are made ex
post the subject. event.) 1 °9 Some normative judgment is therefore re-
quired in determining how much epistemic probability is sufficient to
render an actor outcome-responsible. Perry hints that the requisite de-
gree of epistemic probability is not particularly high 17° and that it is po-
tentially less than the epistemic probability necessary to support a con-
clusion that the relevant type of outcome was normatively foresee-
able—that is, that the actor should have foreseen it.'" Perry also urges
that the judgment should be made "with an eye to what constitutes
meaningful agency in the world." 172 Despite such guidance, however,
Perry concedes that decisions regarding an ordinary person's "mini-
mum capacity to foresee" remain indeterminate, an indeterminacy
curbed only by the extent to which decisionmakers rely on the "com-
mon knowledge of the ordinary person."
Two points may be drawn from Perry's account. First, Perry ex-
plains that each constituent judgment of foreseeability—the judgment
regarding an actor's general capacity to foresee and the judgment re-
garding normative foreseeability—exists merely as a point drawn by
the decisioumaker on the spectrum of epistemic probability. 174 Each
168 See RIPSTE1N, supra note 113, at 105 ("[E]xcept for the most bizarre of coinci-
dences, everything is in principle foreseeable, and everything that has happened as a re-
sult of natural forces is in fact foreseeable.").
169
 The results of social science research suggest that knowledge that an event has oc-
curred influences one's judgment, in hindsight, of its foreseeability. Subjects who are told
that an event in fact happened are more likely (than those who are not so told) to report
that the event was foreseeable. This effect is known as "hindsight bias." See, e.g., Chris
Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 ContlEtt. L. 777, 816 (2001) (finding that
judges are empirically just as likely as other members of the public to fall prey to hindsight
b ias )
170 See Perry. Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 94 (describing Perry's con-
ception as follows: "In general, the epistemic probability that will support a judgment of
reasonable foreseeability need not be particularly high. In a case of unintentional harm, it
is typically much more likely that the harmful outcome will not materialize than that it
will.").
171 See id. at 104-05 (describing generally the difference in foreseeability requisite to
prove outcome-responsibility and the reasonableness of the actor's conduct).
172 Id. at 104. This suggestion, although perhaps helpful at some level, is circular: one
must determine outcome-responsibility (and hence agency) by looking to one's under-
standing of "meaningful agency in the world."
178 See id. at 103; see also supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (describing time
necessary reliance of such normative judgments on the common knowledge of the average
person).
174 See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
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judgment is also drawn by reference to what is presumably the same
event-type and the same reference class of events. 175 Furthermore,
with regard to each judgment, both the characterization of the event-
type and reference class of events and the ultimate line-drawing re-
garding epistemic probability are properly made by reference to the
common experience of the ordinary person. 176
 In light of these com-
monalities, one might argue that for consistency's sake (and for
efficiency's sake) both the general capacity to foresee and normative
foreseeability ought to be determined by the same decisionmaker.
Second, because both foreseeability-related inquiries turn upon the
common knowledge of the ordinary person, what better body to dis-
till and apply such knowledge than the jury, a group of just such peo-
ple?'" Perhaps for these reasons, Perry suggests, at least in passing,
that it is the factfinder that properly determines an actor's general
capacity to foresee."8
The foregoing discussion addresses specifically the account of
foreseeability advanced by Stephen Perry, but it might similarly apply
to other corrective justice theories of negligence." 9
 Although this Ar-
ticle cannot accommodate a comprehensive examination of such, Ar-
thur Ripstein's rich description of risk and responsibility, and of fore-
seeability's role in those concepts, adds an interesting dimension to
the discussion. Ripstein's explication of negligence liability differs
from Perry's in two important respects. First, rather than grounding
his account in outcome-responsibility, Ripstein argues that negligence
represents courts' attempts to enforce fair terms of social interaction,
a process guided by the need to balance shared interests in liberty and
security.m Ripstein asserts that the balance courts have generally
achieved is best explained by the idea of "risk ownership"—only risks
wrongfully imposed are "owned" by the actor in a sense that requires
175
 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
177 See Cardi, supra note 7, at 794-804 (explaining the historical and institutional rea-
sons mitigating in favor of this proposition); Weinrib, supra note 94, at 519 (suggesting that
the standard for permissible risk imposition "is not susceptible of precise measurement
and is applied by the trier of fact on a case by case basis").
175 See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 100 (indicating that it is the
"trier of fact" that will decide the capacity of the ordinary person to foresee harm).
179
 For example, Jules Coleman offers a "mixed" conception of corrective justice. See
genera Au LES L COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992).
18° See RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at 49 ("My interpretation of fault liability ... [em-
braces] the Kantian idea that the boundaries of individual rights are given by fair terms of
social interaction.... by a concern for equal liberty and security for all.").
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compensation.'TM Second, Ripstein objects to Perry's conception of
outcome-responsibility to the extent that it requires subjective knowl-
edge (or even subjective capacity for knowledge) of a risk. 182 Ripstein
urges that instead, negligence embodies a completely objective stan-
dard in this regard.'" Thus, according to Ripstein, "foresight is not
required because it is a general condition of agency.... [Rather,] it is
implicit in the idea of fair terms of interaction." 184
Importantly, although Ripstein seems to define duty and breach
such that each includes some consideration of foreseeability, he con-
tends that foreseeability generally is an independent doctrinal re-
quirement for liability, separate from and prior to both duty and
breach. In Ripstein's words,
[Foresight is] a preliminary test for liability .
	 On this un-
derstanding, if an injury was unforeseeable, there is no fur-
ther question of liability to ask, because the defendant could
not have taken account of the risk that it would happen.
Once the test of foreseeability has been passed, the further
inquiry is fixed by questions of duty and risk. 185
181 See id. ("[T] he boundaries between persons are given by a concern for equal liberty
and security for all.... [F]or purposes of liability, the distinction between what someone
does and what merely happens is a normative distinction. Provided I exercise appropriate
care, the consequences of my actions are treated as though they merely happened. If I fail
to exercise appropriate care, though, the risks I create are mine to bear, and if they ripen
into injuries, I must bear the costs of those injuries.").
182 See id. at 100 "([Perry's account] cannot ... be combined with the idea that the
duty of care is itself objective, in the sense that someone can be responsible for something
that he did not himself foresee."). Perry has responded that Ripstein's conception of con-
trol is too narrow. Perry, The Distribution TUrll, supra note 122, at 332-33; see also Perry,
Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 89-90 (suggesting that due to this argument, it
is unclear whether Ripstein is a corrective justice theorist at all; and that Ripstein's argu-
ment may ultimately devolve into a distributive account of negligence liability). Perry also
promises to respond more extensively to Ripstein's critique in some future work. See Perry,
Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 130 n.80.
183
 See Rit.s . mm , supra note 113, at 56 ("To protect all equally requires weighing liberty
against security, but any weighing is done within the representative reasonable person,
rather than across persons. The point of weighing interests within a representative person
is to avoid allowing the particularities of one person's situation to set the limits of an-
other's liberty or security.").
184 Id. at 105.
126 Id. at 104. In this way, Ripstein's approach is analogous to the provocative sugges-
tion of Ben Zipursky that foreseeability is in fact a constituent of subitantive standing. Sec
generally Zipursky, supra note 97, at 27-40 (proposing his substantive standing theory in
light of several aspects of negligence).
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Unfortunately, Ripstein does little to expound on this suggestion. The
implication, however, is that duty and foreseeability are not co-
dependent concepts. Ripstein thus appears to believe that the essence
of duty is something other than foreseeability. Perhaps duty is simply
the step in liability analysis at which courts create categorical guide-
lines with regard to society's competing interests in liberty and seen-
rity. 188
 By this reasoning, duty determinations might not involve forays
into foreseeability at all.
B. Foreseeability as Instrument
A second theoretical approach explains and justifies negligence
liability, and the doctrinal elements on which liability turns, solely ac-
cording to the goals to be achieved by such a system. From this per-
spective, negligence is merely an instrument; even if negligence doc-
trine exists in some coherent form, it is only meaningful and valid to
the extent that it serves the law's ultimate goals. 187 Possible goals of
negligence include providing compensation for injured persons, loss
spreading, wealth redistribution, deterrence, punishment, social and
personal retribution, efficiency, the maximization of wealth or utility,
and perhaps others. 188 A particular instrumentalist approach might
focus on one goal or serve some combination of goals. Although the
reasoning in this section would apply to any instrumentalist approach,
I will focus on the most comprehensive instrumentalist approach ex-
isting: the economic theory of negligence.
The most prominent economic account of tort law is that of Wil-
liam Landes and Richard Posner. 189 For Landes and Posner, the goal
of tort law is to promote the efficient allocation of resources 190
 or as
Posner has separately proposed, to maximize societal wealth. 181 Ac-
cording to this view, negligence law should create incentives for actors
to take into account the potential costs of their actions. Where the
cost of avoiding a risk of injury would be less than the cost of the risk
186 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at 92 ("In cases of misfeasance, the existence of duty
of care does not depend on the ease with which it can be discharged in the particular in-
stance. Instead, it depends on the significance of the relevant interests in liberty and secu-
rity.").
187 Weinrib, supra note 94, at 487-88 (describing the instrumentalist position).
'as Id. at 487.
me See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRucruttE
or TORT LAW (1987).
190 Id. at 1.
191 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS or LAW I 4 7-5 1 (3d ed. 1986).
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itself, the threat of negligence liability should encourage one to avoid
taking the risk. 192 Conversely, where the cost of prevention is greater
than the cost. of the risk, liability should not ensue. The imposition of
liability in such case would have no appreciable deterrent effect.'"
and would punish the defendant for having acted rationally.'" In this
sense, according to Landes and Posner, negligence should seek to
create an efficient level of deterrence, but no more.
The economic theory of negligence relies on foreseeability in two
ways. First, foreseeability plays a role in the determination of the rea-
sonableness (in economic terms) of a defendant's conduct. In Landes
and Posner's view, foreseeability aids in calibrating the proper level of
deterrence. Only an injury that is foreseeable is capable of being de-
terred.'" Moreover, in determining the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's conduct, the foreseeable probability of injury,'" combined with
its foreseeable range of costs, is to be weighed against the cost of
avoiding thent. 197
 Where the cost of avoiding injury is less than the
cost of the risk, the defendant is deemed to have acted unreasonably
in failing to avoid causing injury. The higher the risk, the more care-
195 Id.; Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 1 LEGAL. Sum. 29,32-33 (1972).
192 Because the cost of avoidance would exceed the benefit of doing so, the defendant
(and similarly situated future actors) will not take preventive measures despite the threat
of legal liability. This reasoning is, of course, subject to an assumption that the level of risk
of the activity is appropriate—if it is not, then a court might impose strict liability rather
than negligence.
194 See Weinrib, supra note 94, at 504 (explaining that "spending more money to pre-
vent an injury than the injury itself costs would be wasteful").
'95 Ste LANDE.S & POSNER, sepia note 189, at 247 ("[Tjhe [one-bite] rule is that the
owner is liable only if he has reason to suspect the dog's vicious disposition; and ordinarily
there is no reason to suspect it until the dog has bitten someone. Even if the probability of
the dog's biting someone is very high, the owner will not be liable unless he has reason to
know it is high. Otherwise, as we have said, liability will have no allocative effect.").
196 Professor Mark Grady has made two important clarifications of Landes and Posner's
theory. First, there is some question whether Landes and Posner condition breach upon
reasonable foreseeability or upon simple objective probability. Professor Grady has sufficiently
demonstrated that it must be the former. See Mark F, Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of
Negligence, 69 lawn L. REV. 363,364 (1984) ("The theory to be explained here demonstrates
that the breach-of-duty question depends on the amount of information concerning the risk
that it was reasonable for the injurer to have had."); id. at 385-391 (demonstrating the same).
Second, Landes and Posner apparently believed that for practical purposes the breach de-
termination should be made only by reference to the risk of the particular injury suffered by
the plaintiff. Id. at 382-83. Professor Grady has demonstrated that this is not and cannot be
the case and that instead, breach must be determined with regard to the entire range of fore-
seeable risks created by a defendant's conduct. Id. at 383-85.
197
 The cost of foreseeing injury—for example, the cost of investigating the various so-
cietal effects of a pesticide that one plans to use on one's garden—is included as part of
the defendant's burden under the Learned Hand formula.
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ful the defendant is required to have been. 198 This, of course, is the
"Learned Hand test" first proposed by Judge Learned Hand in the
case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 199
Even if B < P x L, however, a defendant should be liable only for
harms with regard to which liability will have some allocative effect.
The second way in which economic theory relies on foreseeability is
in deciding which of the various risks created by negligent conduct an
actor should internalize. 20 At one level, it may seem harmless to hold
a defendant liable for all of the consequences of his or her negligent
actions. As Landes and Posner explain, "[i] t may indeed be harmless,
because if the accident is unforeseeable then so is the imposition of
liability for its consequences. Hence there is no danger ... of induc-
ing too much care."2° 1 Assuming perfect enforcement, however, un-
foreseeable injuries are unnecessary and ineffective in producing the
efficient level of deterrence. From the perspective of the individual
actor, the threat of liability for unforeseeable risks will not deter the
relevant conduct because the cost of foreseeing the risk exceeds the
benefit of avoiding that particular risk. 202 Thus, according to Landes
& Posner, courts should not force a defendant to internalize a risk
that is not reasonably foreseeable because such liability would confer
no economic benefit. 203 To impose liability nonetheless would be to
"merely require a costly transfer payment."2"
Landes and Posner offer, by example, the case of Watson v. Ken-
tucky & Indiana Bridge & Railroad Co.,205 in which the defendant neg-
ligently caused a railroad tank car to be derailed and leak fuel, which
ma See, e.g., Lollar v. Poe, 622 So. 2d 902, 905 (Ala. 1993) ('The degree of care re-
quired of an animal owner should be commensurate with the propensities of the particu-
lar animal and with the place where the animals are kept, including its proximity to high-
speed highways."); Indus. Chem. & Fiberglass Corp, v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812, 831 (Ala.
1988) ("[TI hose who deal with dangerous instrumentalities, such as explosives or chemi-
cals, must exercise a great amount of care because the risk is great.").
199
 159 F.2d at 173-74 (enshrining these factors in the mathematical formula in which
liability lies where B (burden of precautions) < P (probability of loss) x L (magnitude of
loss)); see also Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 706 P.2d 364, 369 (Ariz. 1985) (recognizing that
foreseeability of risk and the burden of precautions are "factors which determine the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's conduct"); DOBBS, supra note 2, §§ 143-146, at 334-48
(explaining in detail the interplay of foreseeability and reasonableness here summarized).
200
 Zipursky, supra note 97, at 46.
201 I ANnEs & POSNER, supra note 189, at 247.
202 Id. at 246.
20
 Id. at 247.
2°4 Id.
205 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910).
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subsequently exploded when the plaintiff deliberately set fire to it, 2"
Although the defendant's conduct in Watson was unreasonable in
economic terms (because the cost of avoiding the derailment was less
than the resulting risk of injury), 207 Landes and Posner concur with
the court's finding for the defendant on a foreseeability analysis:
[T] he possibility of arson was so slight (it was an act of pure
malice, with no possibility of pecuniary or any other
benefit—except the delights of pyromania) that ... the de-
fendant would not have taken account of it in deciding how
much care to use; so imposing liability would have had no al-
locative effect. 2°8
According to Landes and Posner, foreseeability's part in reason-
ableness serves the negligence element of breach, whereas the fore-
seeability judgment described above falls tinder the doctrinal um-
brella of proximate cause. 209 Indeed, in their discussion of Watson,
Landes and Posner implicitly justify the "risk rule," a theory of proxi-
mate cause discussed at length in the following section. 210 In theory,
however, so long as negligence liability is conditioned on foreseeabil-
ity in the right ways, an economic approach to negligence is indiffer-
ent to whether such is accomplished by means of duty or breach and
proximate cause. By definition, an instrumentalist approach cares
only about the outcomes generated by the system and little about the
system's intrinsic ordering or conceptual coherence. 211 Economic
theory is thus indeterminate as to foreseeability's proper doctrinal
fit. 2 t 2
200
	
at 147.
407 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 189, at 297 (explaining that in Watson, "the de-
fendant was negligent with respect to the accident probability that was known").
208 Id. Interestingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court later overruled Watson, rejecting the
reasoning cited by Lindes and Posner. Sec Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 493,499-52 (Ky.
1991).
208
	 LANDES & l'OSNER, supra note 189, at 243-51 (discussing the foregoing matters
within the chapter entitled "Causation").
210 See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
211 See Wei nrib, supra note 94, at 487-88.
212
 This conclusion must be hedged in the following way. In a phone conversation re-
garding this Article, Professor Ken Kress pointed out that foreseeability's doctrinal place-
ment might result in a shift in its substance due to the "gravitational effect" of surrounding
doctrine. For example, as the duty question mulls through the brain of the judge, the
judge's consideration of other duty norms might "attract" foreseeability, causing it to be-
come more akin to those norms, or it might repel foreseeability, having the opposite ef-
fect. The jury's consideration of foreseeability in the context of breach or proximate cause
would take place in the presence of a different set of norms, with correspondingly differ-
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This is not to say, however, that the field of law and economics
has nothing to add to the ultimate debate. To the contrary, economic
theory might lend considerable insight into whether court or jury is
the better arbiter of foreseeability. One might argue, for example,
that court-rendered, categorical foreseeability determinations induce
greater efficiency by providing clearer rules for market actors. In ad-
dition, early dismissal of a class of cases almost certainly saves in the
administrative costs of trials. 215 On the other hand, jury decisions are
more precisely calibrated (because they are fact-specific) and may
therefore result in a more accurate efficiency determination in any
particular case and perhaps even over time.2 t 4
Finally, it is perhaps significant that the distinction between fore-
seeability's place in determining economic reasonableness and its role
in deciding which risks a negligent actor should internalize is not so
much a distinction in kind as it is in focus. Consider how the latter
judgment of "reasonable foreseeability" is made. The marginal cost to
the defendant of foreseeing and preventing the particular class of in-
juries suffered by the plaintiff is weighed against the risk of that class
of injuries occurring. If the marginal cost of foresight is less than the
risk of such injury, then the plaintiff's harm was reasonably foresee-
able, and liability ensues. If, on the other hand, the marginal cost of
foresight is greater than the relevant risk, liability would have no allo-
cative effect—the defendant would not have been deterred even in
the face of certain liability. This foreseeability calculus is similar to the
economic determination of reasonableness, except that it focuses on
a particular set of costs and injuries rather than on the entire universe
of the same. In light of this similarity, one might argue that efficiency
ent results. Professor Kress's hypothesis is intriguing, although difficult to study. Thus,
although there is a theoretical possibility that foreseeability is instrumentally better in duty
than breach or proximate cause along these lines, this possibility has not yet been demon-
strated.
41'3
	
Gumo CALABRESI, TIIE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 250-51, 255-56 (1970) (arguing
that the largest administrative cost of the tort system is the case-by-case determination of
accidents by juries).
214 Cf. id. at 256-57 ("[C]ategory-by-category allocation makes the introduction of in-
dividualized moral judgments into the allocation decision harder. This explains why cate-
gory allocation cannot be used in the fault system."). Calabresi also suggests that because
court determinations of foreseeability are less flexible than fact-specific allocations, they
may therefore suffer lags in recognizing changes in who is the cheapest cost-avoider. Id. at
257. Finally, he points out that although categorical, duty-based decisions concentrate on
"general or recurring causes of accidents," they might overlook "some very cheaply
avoided particular causes of very high accident costs." Id.
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is best served if the same decisionmaker—the jury—is entrusted with
both decisions. 216
C. Foreseeability as a Constituent of Relation and Limitation,
Negligence liability is, at least. in some sense, relational. Ours is
not a New Zealand-style social compensation system pursuant to
which everyone pays into a central: fund and from which tort victims
collect.216
 Rather, American courts coerce compensation directly from
tortfeasor to victim. Negligence doctrine must tie the defendant's
wrongful acts to the victim's injuries in a way that justifies coerced re-
payment. 217
 Although the link between the defendant's wrong and the
plaintiffs right to compensation might serve various instrumental
goals,218 it also has moral underpinnings rooted in our desire to effect
recourse and correct moral imbalance. 219 The tails-side of this rela-
tional concept is that negligence liability must typically be limited to
those plaintiffs or injuries for which coerced compensation is morally
justified.22° Coerced transfer that is not so justified offends our gen-
eral commitment to freedom and to property rights, values inexorably
part of the American landscape. 221
A debate roils in the courts and within the academy regarding
the proper doctrinal means for effectuating the concepts of relation
and limitation. According to one view—which I will call the "non-
relational" approach—the concept. of duty or obligation is largely ac-
tor-centered. Pursuant to this view, one owes to society in general an
215
 1 leave more extensive economic evaluation of the court-jury debate to others.
Again, however, I urge that this is the important question to be answered.
219 See Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U.
HAW, L. REV. I, 4 (1989) (describing the compensation scheme in New Zealand).
217 See Weinrib, supra note 94, at 520 ("The concepts of proximate cause and duty
normatively link the wrongfulness of the defendant's unreasonable risk-creation with the
wrongfulness of the plaintiff's suffering.").
219 Sec, eg,, supra notes 200-04- and accompanying text (describing relevant economic
goals).
219
 See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEo. U.
695 (2003) (describing the limits of corrective justice theory and exploring a positive the-
ory of tort based on the idea of "rights, wrongs, and recourse").
220
 There may be a number of bases for limiting negligence liability other than for lack
of a moral justification for coerced transfer of resources. This Section, however, only fo-
cuses on this particular concept of limitation.
221 Indeed, these are the pillars of classic liberalism. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, A HisTouv OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5, 9 (1990); Philip A. Hamburger,
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE LJ. 907, 918-19 (1993).
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obligation to exercise care in one's actions. 222
 Courts thus impose a
duty of care solely on the basis of public policy and community stan-
dards of obligation, without regard to the question of to whom such
duty is owed. From this non-relational perspective, both the relational
aspect of negligence liability and the requisite limitations on liability
are to be resolved primarily via the elements of factual and proximate
causation. 223
According to the "relational" conception, by contrast, the doc-
trinal means for deciding relation and limitation are splintered. Al-
though proximate cause is seen to be the element best suited for im-
posing limits on the scope of liability, duty is the vessel through which
courts establish the proper relation between defendant and plain-
tiff. 224
 To a relationalist, the concept of duty or obligation is incom-
plete without some connection between the actor and a person or
class of persons. 225
 The relational approach thus requires a two-step
duty query: (1) did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff or to a
class of people of which plaintiff is a member, and (2) was it this duty
222
 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 357 ("Certainly [in the early
common law] there is little trace of any notion of a relation between the parties, or an
obligation to any one individual, as essential to the tort. The defendant's obligation to
behave properly apparently was owed to all the world ...."); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The
Theory of Torts, 7 Ara. L. REV. 652, 661 (1873) (describing the universal tort duty as "a duty
imposed on all the world, in favor of all").
223
 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1817-18. Of course, even from a generally
non-relational view of duty, many affirmative duties depend upon the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant—for example, the affirmative duties owed by doctor to
patient or innkeeper to guest.
224 See Weinrib, supra note 99, at 521 ("Duty focuses on the class of persons affected by
the defendant's negligence, proximate cause on the kind of accident or injury generated
by that negligence. The two concepts cover, respectively, the questions of risk to whom and
risk of what.").
2'25 John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VA ND. L. REV. 657, 707 (2001) ("[D]uty in its primary sense is
an analytically relational concept: It concerns obligations of care that are owed by certain
persons to certain other persons.") (emphasis omitted). To illustrate, assume that 1 am the
last living human on earth. In such case, intuition suggests that I cannot possibly owe any
duty of care. According to the relationalist, this intuition stems from the fact that the con-
cept of duty is incomprehensible without considering to whom duty is owed.
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that the defendant allegedly breached? 22° The latter aspect of this in-
quiry is sometimes called the "duty-breach nexus." 227
At the center of the debate between the relational and non-
relational views of duty lies the concept of foreseeability. According to
the non-relational account, foreseeability of the plaintiff and foresee-
ability of the type of the plaintiffs injury operate to limit the conse-
quences of a defendant's negligent act. Although the defendant may
have wrongfully created some risk of injury to some category of people,
the consequences of that wrong must. he limited to people and inju-
ries that were reasonably foreseeable. These limitations might be
justified on instrumental grounds—for example, liability for harm to
an unforeseeable plaintiff or injury cannot serve as a deterrent 228—or
on moral grounds—for example, one cannot be responsible for an
injury or plaintiff that could not have been foreseen and thus could
not have influenced one's choice in acting. 229 Because proximate
cause is generally seen to be the seat of such "limitation" decisions,
the non-relationalist believes that foreseeability of plaintiff and of the
type or manner of injury fit seamlessly in that element.
From a relational view, by contrast, although foreseeability of the
type or manner of injury serves to limit liability in a non-relational
way and therefore fits within the element of proximate cause, plain-
tiff-foreseeability is a necessary constituent of relation. 2" Only if some
harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable might a defendant's relationship
226 See Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1336-39 (explaining this concept in relation to the
idea that the defendant's unreasonable conduct subjected the plaintiff to a "wronging");
Weinrib, supra note 94, at 520 ("['These concepts] exclude]] liability when the plaintiff is
injured by the defendant's wrongful act without being wrongfully injured."); Zipursky,
supra note 97, at 7-15 (explaining the concept generally).
227 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 225, at 709-12 (explaining the duty-breach
nexus requirement). Separately; Professor Zipursky makes the provocative suggestion that
this duty-breach nexus foreseeability is so important and omni-present that it constitutes a
substantive standing requirement for all negligence claims. See Zipursky, supra note 97, at
27-40 (proposing his substantive standing theory in light of several aspects of negligence).
228 See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
23° See Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1337-39 (distinguishing a hypothetical that turns on
the foreseeability of the type of injury—to be handled by proximate cause—from Palsgraf,
which turned on the foreseeability of the plaintiff and is a matter of duty); Perry, Responsi-
bility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 95 (noting that although foreseeability of the plaintiff
is a matter of duty, foreseeability of the type of harm is "the basic principle of proximate
cause").
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with the plaintiff give rise to an obligation of care. 231 Because relation-
based obligation is the essence of duty, plaintiff-foreseeability must, to
a relationalist, constitute a part of the duty calculus.
This divide over the proper doctrinal scheme for the relational
and limiting uses of foreseeability was brought into the spotlight by
the contrasting opinions of Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co." 2 Palsgraf involved the claim of a
railroad passenger who was injured by a falling set of scales while
standing on the station platform. 233 The injury resulted when railroad
employees, standing at the opposite end of the platform from the
plaintiff, negligently dislodged a package from the hands of a passen-
ger while helping him board a departing train. 234 Unbeknownst to the
employees, the package contained fireworks, which exploded upon
impact. 235 The force of the explosion toppled the scales, which in turn
harmed the plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf. 23° Writing for the dissent, Judge
Andrews held that the railroad owed a "duty of refraining from those
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others."237 Accord-
ing to Judge Andrews, this duty was not relational but a duty to the
world. In his words, "[d] ue care is a duty imposed on each one of us
to protect society, ... not to protect A, B, or C alone."2" With the
elements of duty, breach, and factual causation satisfied in Mrs. Pals-
grafs case, Judge Andrews opined that any limitation on the rail-
road's liability must therefore be effected by proximate causation, in
which foreseeability plays an important role. 239
Writing for the majority, Judge Cardozo approached the case
from a relational perspective. Although Judge Cardozo held that the
railroad indeed owed a duty to its passengers and that it had breached
that duty with respect to the man carrying the package (and perhaps
to others nearby), the railroad had nevertheless breached no duty
231 See, e.g., RIPS'IT1N, supra note 113, at 52 ("Parties engaging in potentially risky activi-
ties must show reasonable care for those who might be injured by those activities, not sim-
ply for the persons who turn out to be so injured.").
232 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
233 Id.
234 Id.
233 Id.
236 Id.
237 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
238 Id. at 102.
239 Id. at 103-04. Although Judge Andrews wrote that foreseeability plays a central role
in proximate cause determinations, he felt that the decision was largely a matter of "prac-
tical politics." Id. at 103.
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owed to the plain tiff.240 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Cardozo
reasoned that Id he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty
to be obeyed, and risk imports relation."241 In other words, because it
was not reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actions would in-
jure Mrs. Palsgraf, the requisite relation between the defendant's
wrong and the plaintiff's injury was missing. Without relation there
can be no duty, or at least the duty alleged to have been breached was
not a duty owed to the plaintiff. 242
The central difference between the majority and the dissent in
Palsgraf is whether the requisite relational link between defendant's
wrong and plaintiffs injury should be decided in the context of duty
or proximate cause. As mentioned above, the argument most fre-
quently made in favor of Judge Cardozo's approach is that the "duty-
breach nexus" is a question of relation, not a policy-driven limitation
on liability. 243 It therefore fits best in, and indeed is necessary to, the
element of duty. Foreseeability of the type of injury, on the other
hand, limits liability in a non-relational way and therefore fits within
the element of proximate cause. Professor John Goldberg illustrates
this distinction with the following pair of hypotheticals:
240 See id. at 100 ("What the plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to herself; i.e., a violation
of her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct 'wrongful' be-
cause unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to any one."); see also Goldberg, supm note 43, at 1336
("Ill he conduct in question—although perhaps antisocial, as well as wrongful to persons
standing near the conductors—could, not have amounted to a wronging of [Mrs. Palsgraf];
it did not constitute a harm flowing from a breach of any of the duties that were owed to
her."); Zipursky, supra note 97, at 7-15 (explaining the duty-breach nexus as the core of
Judge Cardozo's opinion).
291 patsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
242
 Professor Perry offers another interesting hypothetical scenario involving the duty-
risk nexus:
The defendant kidnaps someone, and in the course of his felonious activity
quite unforeseeably and non-negligently injures a third party. Does the in-
jured third party have a morally justified claim in tort against the defendant,
just because her injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's vio-
lation of the moral and legal norm against kidnapping?
Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 116. As Perry explains, "the element of
fault [in this hypo] is not related in the right way to the antecedent element of outcome-
responsibility" Id. at 118.
243 Sec Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1820 ("[F]oreseeability is not intended as
a policy-driven or fairness-based limitation on the harms for which a wrongdoer may be
held liable. To read the opinion this way is to convert what Cardozo regarded as a duty
question concerning conduct and obligation into a proximate cause question concerning
the extent of liability. For Cardozo, the foreseeability of harm to a class of persons goes to
the question of whether certain conduct is owed to those persons, not to whether certain
liabilities are appropriately borne by defendant[].").
964	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 46:921
First, imagine a person who, while driving his car on a street
in a moderately busy part of town, carelessly throws a half-
filled paper coffee cup out of the driver's side front window.
The coffee proceeds to splatter on the windshield of a car
coming in the opposite direction, temporarily blocking the
vision of the driver of that car, who swerves, strikes, and seri-
ously injures a pedestrian standing on the far sidewalk.
Now imagine the same careless act—the throwing of the
half-filled coffee cup by the driver—except that, instead of
hitting another car's windshield, the cup lands harmlessly in
the road. However, a pedestrian walking along the far curb
sees the tossing of the coffee, stops in his tracks, and raises his
arms in indignation over the driver's act of littering. Only be-
cause the pedestrian happens to stop at that precise point and
gesticulate, he makes contact with a tree limb, which in turn
disturbs a hidden nest of bees, many of which sting him, caus-
ing him to suffer disfiguring welts and considerable pain. 244
According to Professor Goldberg (and presumably to other rela-
tionalists), the difference in likely outcomes of the first and second
hypotheticals turns on proximate cause rather than on duty. 245 Unlike
Mrs. Palsgraf, the pedestrian in Professor Goldberg's hypothetical was
a foreseeable plaintiff—thus, the relation between driver and pedes-
trian was sufficient to establish the existence of a du ty.246 Rather, it was
the pedestrian's type of injury that was unforeseeable. Presumably
stemming from the view that this brand of foreseeability has little to
do with the relation between plaintiff and defendant, Professor Gold-
berg maintains that although duty is the proper forum for cases such
as Palsgraf, "the notion of proximate cause better explains cases such
as the bee-sting hypothetical."247
The relational account of plaintiff-foreseeability is, in large part,
accurate as a positive description of courts' behavior. Despite what
244 Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1337.
24s
	 at 1338.
216 Id.
247 Id. at 1338 n.64. I say "presumably" because Professor Goldberg does not explain the
reasons underlying this statement—perhaps in light of his more extensive discussion of this
topic in works that he has co-authored with Professor Zipursky, which are cited throughout
this Article.
2005]	 Recanstru cling Fareseeability	 965
some scholars have posited, 218
 many courts seem to view plaintiff-
foreseeability as a duty question. 249
 Such an approach, however, is in
my view conceptually flawed, and one need not adopt a non-relational
view of duty to expose these flaws. One might simultaneously main-
tain the views that duty generally (or at least often) is relational and
that foreseeability's function as a Constituent of relation and limita-
tion is best instantiated by the element of proximate cause. Three
false dichotomies weaken the relational approach: (1) the dichotomy
between plaintiff-foreseeability and foreseeability of the type of injury;
(2) the dichotomy between relation and limitation; and (3) the di-
chotomy between the relational nature of duty and the non-relational
nature of proximate cause. I discuss each in turn.
1. The Dichotomy Between Plaintiff-Foreseeability and Foreseeability
of the Type of Injury
A conclusion that plaintiff-foreseeability must exist as a constitu-
ent of duty but that injury-foreseeability is a matter of proximate
cause rests in part on the presupposition that there exists some mean-
ingful distinction between the two concepts. It is this distinction that
Professor Goldberg seeks to illustrate by comparing Palsgraf with the
bee-sting hypothetical. 250
 The most that Professor Goldberg's com-
parison reveals, however, is that fact patterns which, from a relational
view, present an issue of plaintiff-foreseeability are merely a subset of
cases that call for a determination of the foreseeability of a particular
248 As Professor Zipursky points out, the predominant approach in torts casebooks is to
discuss Palsgraf in the section detailing proximate cause. See Zipursky, supra note 97, at 3 &
n.4 (citing the relevant casebooks).
248
 A recent canvass of state court decisions revealed only two jurisdictions that clearly
favor an Andrews-like approach to plaintiff-foreseeability. See Wintersteen v. Nat'l Cooper-
age & Woodenware Co., 197 N.E. 578, 582 (III. 1935) ("It is axiomatic that every person
owes a duty to all persons to exercise ordinary care to guard against any injury which may
naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of his act .... This
duty .... extends to remote and unknown persons."); Alvarado v. Sersch, 662 N.W.2d 350,
353 (Wis. 2003) ("Wisconsin has long followed the minority view of duty set forth in the
dissent of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.... '[EJveryone owes to the world at large the
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.'")
(citation omitted) (quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting)). But see RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) g 29, Re-
porter's Note to cmt. f, at 45-49 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003) (citing cases that purport-
edly consider plaintiff-foreseeability to be a matter of proximate cause). Interestingly, a
growing number of courts also sweep foreseeability of the type and manner of injury into
the penumbra of duty. See Cardi, supra note 7, at 755-60 (describing this phenomenon and
citing examples).
450 See Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1337.
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risk or a particular type of injury. One might, for example, describe
the issue in Palsgraf to be not whether Mrs. Palsgraf was foreseeably
harmed by the act of dislodging a package out of a distant passenger's
hands, but whether it was foreseeable that such act could result in
harm due to an explosion. 251 Of course, a relationalist might suggest
that even so, the question remains whether Mrs. Palsgraf was foresee-
ably injured by such an explosion. This too, however, is unproblem-
atically characterized in terms of injury rather than plaintiff: if an ex-
plosion was foreseeable, was it also foreseeable that injury would
result both of the type Mrs. Palsgraf received and in the manner in
which she received it? Similar reasoning might apply to many cases
that courts currently deem to involve plaintiff-foreseeability. 252
In light of this alternative perspective on plain tiff-foreseeability,
the distinction between Palsgraf and Professor Goldberg's bee-sting
hypothetical is rendered at least potentially meaningless. That is, the
relational distinction between plaintiff-foreseeability and injury-
foreseeability becomes unnecessary absent some practical or tneta-
conceptual reason to keep it. 253 A desire that courts rather than juries
decide such questions might supply such a reason. The more com-
mon justification, however, is that duty, not proximate cause, is rela-
tional, and that a relational understanding of duty requires the dis-
251 Judge Andrews approximated this reasoning in applying his "hindsight" test, a pe-
culiar variant of foreseeability. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting)
("[Gliven such an explosion as here, it needed no great foresight to predict that the natu-
ral result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene than
was the plaintiff."). Professor Grady also proposes a risk-oriented interpretation of Palsgraf.
See Grady, supra note 196, at 414 (explaining Palsgraf as having applied the "reasonable-
foresight doctrine" where "the same set of precautions reduces two different expected
harms or risks," one foreseeable and one not).
252 For example, Professor Perry's kidnapping hypothetical, for instance, described su-
pra note 242, is equally susceptible to such an analysis. Rather than presenting the question
of whether kidnapping posed a foreseeable risk to the injured driver, the issue might in-
stead be described as whether injury by car crash is a foreseeable risk of kidnapping. See
also Fawley v. Martin's Supermarkets, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 10, 12-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (ana-
lyzing plaintiff-foreseeability when plaintiffs sued a supermarket for negligent failure to
protect them from a drunk driver outside the defendant's business); Valentine v. On Tar-
get, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 949-50 (Md. 1999) (same when a plaintiff sued the defendant gun
dealer for the murder of the plaintiff's decedent, committed by a third party with a gun
stolen from the defendant's store).
253 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCI-
PLES) § 29, Reporter's Note to cmt. m (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003) (suggesting that Pals-
graf and similar cases do not necessarily turn on plaintiff-foreseeability, but might just as
easily be characterized as foreseeability of harm cases); William Powers, Jr., Reputology, 12
CARDOZO L. REv. 1941, 1949 (1991) (same).
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tinction and separation of plaintiff-foreseeability from injury-foresee-
ability. It is to this assertion that I now turn.
2. The Dichotomy Between Relation and Limitation
As described above, the primary justification for assigning plaintiff-
foreseeability to duty and foreseeability of type of injury to proximate
cause is the distinction between relation and limitation: the essence of
duty is a relation-based obligation of which plaintiff-foreseeability is a
necessary constituent, and the essence of proximate cause is to serve as
a tool for limiting liability with regard to which injury-foreseeability is
relevant. The basic dichotomy on which this justification rests, however,
is flawed. Relation and limitation are not distinct concepts, at least not
in the context of foreseeability determinations. Rather, they are merely
two possible conclusions to the following question: is the link between
defendant's wrong and plaintiffs injury of a kind for which community
notions of obligation and policy suggest that a defendant be held li-
able? A finding that the plaintiff and the plaintiff's injury were foresee-
able provides a basis for finding such a link and therefore justifies co-
erced compensation; a finding that the plaintiff or injury was
unforeseeable means that such a link is absent and therefore serves to
"limit" the reach of coerced compensation even in the face of wrongful
conduct. 254
This is not to say that the relation and limitation inquiries com-
pletely overlap. Indeed, as relationalists point out, plaintiff-
foreseeability is merely a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a
finding of the requisite relation. 255
 Similarly, limitations on the extent
of liability also might stem from other sources256—for example, due to
the lapse of time between the negligent act and injury. 257
 The foresee-
254
 Although Professor Perry considers. at least as a normative matter, plaintiff fore-
seeability to be a matter of duty and injury-foreseeability to be a matter of proximate cause,
Perry seems to recognize that relation and limitation are inexorably tied: "Some [facets of
proximate cause] ... seem to be built into the concept of outcome-responsibility itself....
If a foreseeable type of harm occurs in too freakish or improbable a manner, there is in-
sufficient control over the outcome to support a judgment of outcome-responsibility ...."
See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 95.
255 E.g. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, 1818-19.
256
 See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 104, at 95 ("There are many facets to
the law of proximate cause in addition to the basic foreseeability principle.").
257 Sec. e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (holding that the defen-
dant state could not be held liable for the murder of a girl by a parolee five months follow-
ing the parolee's release from prison, in part because of the significant lapse in time be-
tween the parole release and the murder).
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ability aspect of relation and limitation, however, simply combines two
opposing forces of the same inquiry—the desire for relation and the
preservation of residual freedoms. Division of the concept between
separate elements of negligence is therefore misleading and redun-
dant.
Such an argument is, of course, indeterminate as to whether duty
or proximate cause is the better home for the combined inquiry. In
fact, this is precisely the point. If the distinction between relation and
limitation is indeterminate as to the proper doctrinal home for fore-
seeability, perhaps the only determinative factor is whether court or
jury is the preferable primary decisionmaker.
3. The Dichotomy Between the Relational Nature of Duty and the
Non-Relational Nature of Proximate Cause
Even if one disagrees with the assertion that relation and limita-
tion are opposing aspects of the same inquiry, the common charge
that relation is exclusive to duty and that limitation is exclusive to
proximate cause is, in my view, not accurate. Rather, duty and proxi-
mate cause are both relational in some respect, and both also limit
liability. 258
 The charge is therefore indeterminate as grounds for con-
ditioning duty on plaintiff-foreseeability.
Despite Judge Andrews's protests that each of us owes to the
world a duty to avoid causing harm, 259 it is difficult to deny that duty is
at least sometimes relational. Many of our daily obligations, both legal
and pre-legal, exist only in relation to a limited group of people. For
example, the duty to clothe and feed others extends only to our de-
pendent children, the duty to warn or rescue others extends only to
those with whom we have some "special relationship," 260 and the duty
258 The view that duty often serves to limit negligence liability is relatively uncontrover-
sial. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 470, 474 (explaining that judges have used duty
to keep negligence decisions out of the hands of the jury in order to limit the liability of
burgeoning enterprise); Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Con-
solidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liabil-
ity Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN llimo L. REV. 1503, 1525 (1997) (explaining
the expanded reach of duty as a means of effecting a '`conservative" vision of the proper
extent of liability). I therefore focus on the claim that proximate cause, as well as duty, is
relational.
259 See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
260 See, e.g., Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) (holding that a boat
owner did not have a duty to warn a guest against diving into shallow water); Methola v.
County of Eddy, 629 P.2d 350, 353-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that jailors have a
duty to protect and rescue inmates from other abusive inmates); IttsTATEmENT (SECOND)
of `nom § 314A (1965) (explaining that common carriers, innkeepers, land possessors,
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to protect those on our property depends upon the status of our rela-
tionship with them. 261 Other obligations we owe to all others. As a
general matter, for instance, we must not intentionally punch anyone
in the nose or drive a car so unreasonably that we crash into another.
These "universal duties" might also be described as relational in the
sense that they too are owed to a defined class of persons, albeit an
inclusive one. 262
Even conceding that duty is relational, however, one need not
conclude that the relational aspect. of negligence liability rests exclu-
sively with duty. Nor is it self-evident that duty is the most effective
tool for linking the defendant's wrong with the plaintiffs injury.
Proximate cause also plays a role in establishing relation—a role that
neatly overlaps the work performed by duty and by plaintiff-
foreseeability in Palsgraf. 263 A comparison of Palsgrafs relational duty
analysis with the "risk rule" for proximate cause illustrates the point.
Recall that a relational duty inquiry consists of two steps: (1)
whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff or to a class of peo-
ple of which plaintiff is a member, and (2) whether it was this duty that
the defendant allegedly breached.264
 Proximate cause, as defined by
the risk rule, asks whether the plaintiff's injury was "different from
the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious." 265
 At least
with regard to plain tiff-foreseeability, these duty and proximate cause
inquiries pose the very same question: was the defendant's act wrong-
and those in custodial roles owe to customers, invitees, or those in their custody a duty to
protect, warn of dangers, and offer first aid). The duty to aid also extends to those with
respect to whom the defendant has created a continuing risk of harm. Donns, supra note
2, § 316, at 856-57.
See supra note 56 and infra note 308 (citing sources that explain the distinction in
many jurisdictions between duties owed to licensees, invitees, and trespassers).
262 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 225, at 707.
2" Factual causation also requires a relational link (in the form of causation) between
the defendant's wrong and the plaintiffs injury.
2" See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Actually, the duty inquiry requires a
third step as well—the question of if a duty was owed, what is the general scope of that
duty? Was it a general duty to use reasonable care, or some more specific duty?
265
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF' TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
§ 29 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003); see also ROBERT E. KEF:TON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF
Towr 10 (1963) ("A negligent actor is legally responsible for the harm, and only the harm,
that ... is a result within the scope of the risks by reason of which the actor is found to be
negligent."); kirsTEnst, supra note 113, at 65 ("[Lliability is limited to the risks that make
the conduct wrongful.").
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fill in relation to the plaintiff's injury? 266 Consider the following ex-
planation of the reasoning involved in each. In acting, a defendant
created a range of potential risks—picture this range as a circle,
within which any given point represents a potential risk. In deciding
that the defendant's act was wrongful, the jury draws a smaller circle
within this range. The smaller circle represents the jury's normative
judgment regarding which of the potential risks were reasonably fore-
seeable and avoidable. Every point within the smaller circle represents
a risk that the defendant ought to have taken into account when act-
ing. 267
 Every point outside of the smaller circle represents a risk that
the reasonable person would not have taken action to avoid. In the
context of Palsgraf, for example, the railroad employees ought to have
considered that in helping the man onto the train they might bruise
him or cause him to fall. This risk of injury is therefore within the cir-
cle of risk that made the employees' conduct wrongful. Similarly, the
employees ought to have considered that they might cause his pack-
age to drop and its contents to break. Perhaps they should even have
considered the risk of jostling nearby passengers. The risk of explo-
266 At least one relationalist appears to admit as much. In a provocative article in which
he ascribes to Palsgraf s duty-risk rule the weight of a substantive standing requirement,
Professor Zipursky states that:
[I]t appears that the risk rule can be understood as a conflation of the sub-
stantive standing rule with some form of causation requirement. The risk rule
presupposes that the conduct must have involved the wrongful taking of a risk
of certain injuries to the plaintiff—in other words, negligence in relation to
the plaintiff.
Zipursky, supra note 97, at 35. I disagree, however, with Professor Zipursky's explanation
that the risk rule 'presupposes" that the defendant's act created some risk "to the plain-
tiff." To the contrary, such is precisely part of the relation that the risk rule seeks to estab-
lish. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 113, at 65,67-68 (explaining the relationality of negligence
liability, and more specifically the "ownership" of risk, in terms of the risk rule: "[I]f we
understand the boundaries between persons as existing in moral rather than geometric
space, we see that the fault system can coherently hold someone liable only for the losses
that are within the risk implicit in the violated standard of care."); Perry, Moral Foundations,
supra note 94, at 484 ("Tisk is the relational concept that connects the active and passive
aspect of injurious conduct, so that what the defendant did and what the plaintiff suffered
are not regarded as two discrete happenings.'") (quoting Ernest j. Weinrib, Right and Ad-
vantage in Private Law, 10 Cnittiozo L. REV. 1283,1304-05 (1989)); Weinrib, supra note 94,
at 521 ("The concepts of proximate cause and duty connect wrongful doing to wrongful
suffering by requiring the plaintiff's injury to be the fruition of the unreasonable risk that
renders the defendant's action wrongful.").
267 in terms of foreseeability, there are perhaps two smaller circles within the range of
risks created by the railroad employees' action. There is a smaller circle representing the
foreseeable risks and an even smaller circle still representing the reasonably foreseeable
risks. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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sion, on the other hand, or the risk that their act might topple distant
scales, or the risk that they might hurt a passenger as far away as Mrs.
Palsgraf all are risks that would not have been considered by the ordi-
nary person. In the language of the risk rule, such risks were not what
made the employees' act wrongful. In the language of judge Cardozo,
the defendant breached no duty with respect to such risks. 268 In either
case, such risks were not reasonably foreseeable. 269
Each of the false dichotomies described above indicates that
proximate cause standing alone might fulfill the component of rela-
tionality often currently decided in the context of duty by plaintiff-
foreseeability. This is not, of course, to say that the elements of duty
and proximate cause are redundant. The question central to duty re-
mains whether the defendant owed some obligation of care. The es-
sence of proximate cause remains whether the plaintiff's injury ex-
ceeds the scope of the risk that the defendant created in breaching a
duty. Furthermore, although both elements involve some aspect of
the relation between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiff's injury,
there is a fundamental difference in the level of generality from which
each element approaches the question. The existence of a duty is a
threshold question. It is the gatekeeper for negligence liability; in-
cluding or excluding potential liability with regard to broad group-
ings of fact patterns. Duty questions and the relational inquiries rele-
vant to them are therefore, to the extent possible, acontextual.
Proximate cause, on the other hand, serves as the final and finest
sieve. Whereas duty examines the relation between broad categories
of defendants and plaintiffs, wrongs and injuries, proximate cause
considers relation in the full dress of context.
268
 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
269 1 offer this discussion of the similarity between the duty-risk nexus and the risk rule
for the purpose of showing that proximate cause is equally as capable of establishing this
aspect of relation as is duty. I would contend that the risk rule is virtually identical in effect
as a generalized foreseeability inquiry properly formulated, although a full discussion of
the point exceeds the scope of this Article. For a rigorous, if ultimately flawed, critique of
the risk rule, see Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in Me An; 3 Timoityricitt,
INQUIRIES IN Likw 333, 365-411 (2002) (criticizing the risk rule on grounds that (1) be-
cause there is no 'correct" description of a risk, the risk rule is arbitrary; (2) because every
risk is considered its determining fault, the risk rule leads to liability for all resulting
harms; and (3) the risk rule is incompatible with other rules such as superseding cause,
the thin-skull rule, and the denial of recovery for harms that are remote in spatio-temporal
terms). For a compelling response to these arguments, see Israel Gilead, Harm Screening
Under Negligence Law 14-17 (Sept. 26, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
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The foregoing account admittedly leaves two pieces of the fore-
seeability puzzle unanswered. First, if the only meaningful distinction
between the relational inquiries of duty and proximate cause is the
level of generality at which they are made, then why not a scheme in
which foreseeability plays a role in both elements, differing only in
the generality of its approach? It is to this question that I turn in Part
III.D, immediately below. 270
 Second, even if proximate cause can ac-
commodate the relational determinations often currently rendered in
the context of duty, can a relational view of duty exist without the
looking glass of foreseeability? Although a complete examination of
this question must he left to future work, my intuition is that the an-
swer is yes. In an every-day sense, the essence of an affirmative care-
taking relationship between two people is not that one of them might
become injured. Rather, such a relationship is the result of a volun-
tary commitment from one to the other, an inclusion of the other
within one's sphere of influence—the mother's exercise of her paren-
tal rights, the innkeeper's invitation to stay the night, the doctor's
promise to treat, the police officer's promise to guard, the driver's
non-negligent creation of a driving hazard, or the rescuer's attempt to
rescue. In each of these situations, the actor's conduct is a self-
initiated curtailment of her own liberty, a commitment—whether ac-
tual or implied—to a relationship with another. It is this commitment,
and not foreseeability, that provides the foundation for a court's ex-
amination of relation and obligation.
D. Categorical Foreseeability
What about a theory of duty and proximate cause according to
which foreseeability plays a role in both elements, differing only in
the generality of its approach? Such an understanding is not uncom-
mon. In duty, so the theory goes, courts determine whether the al-
leged class of plaintiff, risk, or type of injury is generally foreseeable
to the class of people of which the defendant is a member.271 If not,
270 See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
271
 Such a theory is often limited to the context of plaintiff-foreseeability, leaving in-
jury-foreseeability to proximate cause. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET Al.., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 199-200 n.9 (3d ed. 2004); see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1818-20,
1828 (explaining that the duty inquiry focuses on whether the relevant class of defendants
owes a duty to the relevant class of plaintiffs to act in accordance with a certain standard of
care). Courts frequently, however, decline to impose a duty after concluding that a class of
risk or injury is not generally foreseeable to a particular class of defendants. See, e.g., Bal-
lard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624,628 n.6 (Cal. 1986) ("The foreseeability of a particular kind of
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the court must dismiss the case for lack of (luty.272
 If so—and if other
duty-relevant factors mitigate in favor—then the defendant will be
deemed to have owed the alleged duty. The only question remaining
for proximate cause, under such an approach, is whether the particu-
lar plaintiff, risk, or injury was sufficiently unforeseeable within the
factual context of the case as to preclude liability. In other words,
foreseeability in the context of duty is categorical, whereas foresee-
ability in proximate cause is individualized and context-dependent.
Although such an approach addresses the conceptual requirements of
negligence in some workable fashion, I urge in this section that it
should be abandoned nonetheless.
In considering the validity of this or any other conception of duty
in which categorical foreseeability plays a starring role, three aspects
of categorical foreseeability require separate attention: (I) the cate-
gorical incapacity to foresee, (2) categorical unforeseeability as
grounds not to impose a duty, and (3) the imposition of an
affirmative obligation due to categorical higher-than-average foresee-
ability. I discuss each in turn.
I. Categorical Incapacity to Foresee
In certain limited circumstances, courts have held that a class of
defendants' mental or physical capacity to foresee is so undeveloped
or diminished that a defendant. within such a class cannot be said to
owe a duty of care at all. Thus, most courts hold that defendants be-
low a certain age presumptively are not liable in negligence. 273 Simi-
larly, a driver who unexpectedly is rendered unconscious is not held
liable for the resulting damages. 274 One might characterize such
harm plays a very significant role in this calculus, but a court's task—in determining
'duty—is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in
light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether
the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm
experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.") (citation
omitted).
272 Determining the relevant class presents the same potential for indeterminacy as
does the characterization of the relevant reference class of events for purposes of deciding
foreseeability generally. Sec supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (explaining this
indeterminacy).
273 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
274 See Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rpm 2d 635, 638 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing a line of cases
holding as much). In addition, some forms of incapacity lead courts to hnpose a lesser
standard of care, rather than to deny duty altogether. For example, a blind defendant is
generally held to an obligation to use only the care of a reasonable blind person. E.g. Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 396 So. 2d 566, 568 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
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bright-line rules as judgments regarding the categorical unforesee-
ability of injury or plaintiff to such classes of defendants. Because any
risk, injury, or potential plaintiff is categorically unforeseeable to a
four year-old, for example, the child cannot owe a duty of care.
As explained in Part III.A above, however, such rules are not best.
described as foreseeability determinations at all, even categorical
ones.275
 The rules limiting the negligence liability of children or un-
conscious drivers are not conditioned upon any category of risk, in-
jury, or plaintiff, but rather depend solely on the physical and mental
characteristics of the class of defendant. 2" Unlike even categorical
foreseeability determinations, incapacity decisions are completely di-
vorced from any other factual context. 277
Furthermore, an explanation of incapacity rules that turns on
foreseeability faces a serious descriptive anomaly. Courts generally
impose an ordinary duty of care upon mentally incapacitated but not
upon physically incapacitated defendants, although the potential con-
sequences of their acts may be equally unforeseeable to members of
either class. 278 In light of this inconsistency, perhaps the justification
behind incapacity rules is not categorical unforeseeability, but rather
the determination that unlike the mentally incapacitated, neither the
physically incapacitated nor the very young can be deemed to have
acted at al1. 279
275 See supra note 160 and the text of the surrounding paragraph.
276 One might, of course, characterize such determinations as relational in a way that is
similar to a relational description of the general duty of care to avoid causing harm to
another. Such decisions embody the judgment that a class of risk, injury, or plaintiffs de-
scribed as "any" is unforeseeable to a class of defendants. Even so, however, the distinction
between a class defined as "all the world" and some more contextually limited class is an
important one in sorting out the proper doctrinal home for foreseeability.
277 This distinction is not only descriptively accurate, but it also supports the argument
that categorical incapacity, but not categorical unforeseeability, is properly decided as a
matter of duty. The more context-independent a decision, the better the case for leaving it
in the hands of the court; the more context-dependent, the more reason to send it, in the
first instance, to the jury. See Cardi, supra note 7, at 801-03 (explaining why juries are the
better entity for deciding fact-dependent inquiries).
278
 Kelley, supra note 85, at 237. One possible explanation for this seeming discrepancy
is society's general apathy toward the mentally ill. See id. at 205 ("The generic law review
article often goes on to suggest that the different treatment of the mentally ill reflects
outmoded and unjustified prejudice against them."). This fails to explain why negligence
liability for the mentally ill has become stricter since the 1800s, see id. at 183-203 (describ-
ing the law's historical development), while society's understanding and tolerance of men-
tal illness has presumably increased.
279 See id. at 238 ("When the defendant driver faints without forewarning and his un-
guided car drifts into the left lane the driver has not acted in violation of the safety con-
vention because at the time his car crossed into the left lane he was not acting at all.").
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In short, although it is practical and conceptually proper that
courts set specialized duty rules based on categorical judgments of
incapacity, such judgments are not dependent upon foreseeability.
Hence, the existence of categorical incapacity rules does not afford
foreseeability a foothold in duty.
2. Categorical Unforeseeability as Grounds Not to Impose a Duty
In most jurisdictions, the host of a non-commercial social event
may serve alcohol without fear of liability for injuries caused by a
drunken guest. 2m Typically, courts have barred social host liability on
the grounds that a host owes no duty to an intoxicated guest or to
third parties injured thereby, either because social hosts as a class
cannot foresee how much alcohol a guest will consume and cannot.
know when a guest has become intoxicated, or because a host cannot
foresee or control an intoxicated guest's conduct. 28I Such reasoning
seems disingenuous, however, in light of the fact that a social host of-
ten does know that a guest has imbibed excessively and is able to fore-
see, for example, that the guest might harm herself or others while
driving home. This seeming contradiction might be generalized as
follows. The denial of a duty due to categorical unforeseeability is tan-
tamount to holding that even if the defendant was not vigilant, the
defendant's lack of vigilance would not be blameworthy because the
class of risk, injury, or plaintiff is generally unforeseeable to the de-
fendant-class. if the risk, injury, or plaintiff was in fact foreseeable to
the particular defendant, however, the stated reason for refusing to
impose a duty is gone. The categorical no-duty rule thus stands on
quicksand, and some unstated justification must therefore underlie
these rulings.
Similarly, as anyone with experience with young children can attest, it is sometimes
difficult to say whether any particular movement of limb is deliberate or the result of some
random firing of maturing neurons. At any rate, even if many of a child's actions do seem
deliberate, a court might yet wish to steer clear of the thicket of determining which are
which.
28' See, e.g., McGuiggan v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 142 (Mass. 1986)
("Under traditional common law tort analysis, our inquiry is whether a social host violated
a duty to an injured third person by serving an alcoholic beverage to a guest .... [which]
require[s] consider- Union of] whether the social host unreasonably created a risk of
injury ...."): Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P.2d 305, 310-12 (Utah 2000) (considering
whether the social host-guest relationship gives rise to a special relationship that imposes
on the social host an affirmative duty either to control or protect her guests).
" I E.g. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex. 1993).
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One possibility is that categorical unforeseeability serves as a ves-
sel for hidden decisions of policy; in the social host context, for ex-
ample, courts may simply wish to protect the institution of social
gatherings at which alcohol is served. 282
 Another possibility is that in
deciding such cases based on duty, courts unwillingly engage in what
is commonly understood to constitute breach or proximate cause
analysis without the requisite deference to the jury. 283 I have discussed
the hazards of each of these possibilities elsewhere. 284
Two further potential justifications exist, however. First, categori-
cal unforeseeability rulings might serve as a tool to control transac-
tion costs. A court might reason, for example, that because the inci-
dence of social host cases in which a risk, injury, or plaintiff is
foreseeable is extraordinarily low, identifying such cases is not worth
the requisite expenditure of judicial resources. This reasoning is, of
course, not limited to social host cases; any case in which the court
declines to impose a duty on grounds of categorical unforeseeability
might thus be justified. By dismissing such cases based on categorical
unforeseeability, courts arguably avoid a likely unfruitful context-
specific foreseeability inquiry and discourage future analogous suits.
A court is, of course, empowered to make such a decision, although it
is unclear just how much cost is saved thereby. 285
 More important,
however, is the gravity of a decision to sacrifice the interests of a plain-
tiff (and of future plaintiffs) whom another's wrong has foreseeably
injured simply because it would be too costly over time to sort the
wheat from the chaff. At the very least, courts should be clear that
such is the basis for their rulings—that they are denying liability in a
class of cases not because the defendant was not blameworthy, but be-
282 See Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1227-29 (discussing the opposing policy interests in social host
cases); Cardi, supra note 7, at 763-65,787-90 (same); Linda E. Fisher, Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms: Autonomy, the Common Good, and the Courts, 18 YALE L. & POLY REV. 351,370-73
(2000) (same).
2a3 Cardi, supra note 7, at 774-81.
2a4 See id. at 790-804 (arguing that the former is improper to the extent that foresee-
ability obscures the underlying policy decision and that the latter is improper because it
robs the jury of its rightful role in deciding negligence and proximate cause).
2E6
 For example, a court must still determine whether a particular case fits within an
established no-duty category—au inquiry that may yet require fact-finding by the jury.
Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent no-duty decisions discourage future lawsuits;
attorneys are trained to distinguish their cases from potentially controlling precedent, a
task made especially inviting by the particularly fact-specific nature of negligence cases.
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cause they have decided not to consider the question for administra-
tive convenience.28°
As a final potential justification for categorical unforeseeability,
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky suggest that by excluding liability
categorically, courts prioritize certain obligations over others and pro-
vide clearer rules for actors. 287 Although Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky do not explicitly state as much, I understand their point to be
that categorical foreseeability is useful insofar as it encourages actors to
prioritize their efforts to take care where doing so will have some rea-
sonable chance of avoiding injury. Only classes of scenarios in which
the risk, injury, and plaintiff are "foreseeable enough" are worthy of a
"prioritized" duty of care. Professor Goldberg and Zipursky's account
represents a plausible but exceedingly strong view of the judge's role in
negligence cases—a view of the judge as frequent rule-maker, as micro-
manager. This was the view of Justice Holmes as he imposed specific
rules for railroad-crossings in Baltimore &' Ohio Railroad Co. v. Good-
man, 288 an approach resoundingly (if respectfully) rejected seven years
later by Justice Cardozo in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co. 2m I concede that
in the decades since Pokora (and especially since the early 1980s),
courts seem to be sliding back to the idea that they must keep a tighter
288 See CALA BREs c, supra note 213, at 250-51, 255-56 (arguing that the largest adminis-
trative cost of the tort systetn is the case-by-case determination of accidents by juries).
297 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1831-32 (articulating the value of the
prioritizing effect of categorical duties). As they explain:
If one has a duty of care to another, that other person figures (or should
figure) in one's deliberation in a certain way. Because the possibility of duty
serving a prioritizing role is compromised by casting the duty net too wide,
the questions arises as to which types of persons are obligated to be vigilant to
avoid causing certain types of harm to certain others.
Id. at 1838.
283 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (holding categorically that "if a driver cannot be sure other-
wise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle"). In so
holding. Justice Holmes acted upon his longstanding view that judges should more actively
apply their cumulative wisdom to prescribe specific duties in categories of cases. Sea ld. ("It
is true ... that the question of due care very generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing
with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once for
all by the Courts.") (citation omitted); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective
Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. 1,. REV. 1481, 1485 (1992) (noting that justice Holmes's Goodman
opinion was an attempt to implement the theories he had propounded in The Common
Law).
2°4
 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934) (holding that it was for the jury to decide whether the de-
fendant's conduct was unreasonable, where the layout of a grade crossing was such that to
exit one's car to check for oncoming trains—as was one's duty pursuant to Goodman—
would be to increase, rather than to reduce, the risk of catastrophe).
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rein on duty and hence on the jury's power to decide negligence. In
doing so, however, courts sacrifice justice in the individual case in
which risk, injury, or plaintiff in fact was foreseeable.29°
Furthermore, it has not been demonstrated that the particular-
ized guidance of court-made rules is necessary or effective in prioritiz-
ing people's efforts at care. Nor is there any evidence that particular-
ized duties are normatively superior in this respect to the generalized
duties to avoid unreasonably causing harm to another or to take rea-
sonable precautions to protect another with whom one has a special
relationship.291 Scant sociological research exists to support such a
hypothesis,292 and the comparative merit of rules to standards gener-
ally is a matter of perpetual jurisprudential debate. 2" Without evi-
dence that particularized rule-guidance is preferable, the long-
deliberated policy judgments embodied by the general duties of care
should stand.
Finally, one might question the institutional ability of courts to
render categorical unforeseeability determinations. The categorical
unforeseeability inquiry consists of three steps: (1) a description of
the relevant categories of defendant and risk, injury, or plaintiff, (2) a
finding that the incidence of foreseeability is lower for the applicable
pair of categories than it is for society generally, and (3) a normative
judgment that the incidence is sufficiently low to justify the denial of
liability. Although the last of these determinations is arguably within
the court's bailiwick, the second entails a factual investigation perhaps
best accomplished by a legislature or an administrative agency, and a
290 Cardi, supra note 7, at 798-804.
291 cf. RwsTEIN, supra note 113, at 105 ("[A]gents need to be able to know which ac-
tions can be performed without fear of legal sanction, and, more to the point, the interests
of others of which they must take account. The limitation of liability to foreseeable injuries
is an expression of the idea that people must be in a position to know their rights and the
rights of others. Reasonable foreseeability is required ... because it is public in the right
way, that is, accessible in principle both to those who might injure others and those who
might be injured by them.") (emphasis omitted).
2°2 This conclusion is based upon conversations with two sociology professors at the
University of Kentucky. As of publication, no specific sources for this conclusion could be
idea tified.
292 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBER'1' M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEBIS
IN Tim MAKING AND APPLICATION Or LAW 138-41 (1994) (discussing generally the relative
value of rules versus standards). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING Rtrarrs SERIOUSLY
(1977) (challenging the primacy of rules over principles and proposing a structure for
their co-existence); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY TilE RULES (1992) (advocating the
law's reliance on specific rules rather than on generalized standards).
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description of the relevant categories is rendered less indeterminate,
if at. all, only by reliance on the jury. 294
In sum, there are no dispositive conceptual justifications for
courts' use of categorical unforeseeability as a reason to deny the exis-
tence of a duty. The justifications offered by courts and scholars turn
out to be merely instrumental—that categorical unforeseeability
serves administrative convenience or better guides actors' behavior.
Furthermore, the objects of such instrumentalism appear to be nor-
matively irresolute. Without good reasons to embrace categorical un-
foreseeability, it therefore should be abandoned.
3. Imposition of an Affirmative Duty Due to Categorical Higher-Than-
Average Foreseeability
As many courts look to categorical unforeseeability as a reason to
deny duty, courts also treat. the particular ability of a class of defen-
dants to foresee a class of risk, injury, or plaintiff as a reason to im-
pose an affirmative duty. The quintessential example of this
affirmative use of categorical foreseeability is the California Supreme
Court's decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California. 295 In
that case, the court imposed on the defendant psychologist a duty to
take reasonable care on behalf of the decedent Tatiana Tarasoff, a
non-patient, with regard to the threats on her life made by one of the
psychologist's patients. 296 The court's duty analysis did not turn on
the particular context of the case. Rather, the court imposed a duty in
part due to the special relationship between psychologist and patient,
but also because psychologists as a class are often privy to their pa-
dents' potentially injurious intentions toward third parties. 297
294 Sec supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. It is interesting that although Pro-
fessors Goldberg and Zipursky explicitly endorse categorical foreseeability decisions, they
decry intrusions into the realm of the legislature when discussing the duty-as-policy ap-
proach of Justice Holmes and Dean Prosser. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at
1739-44 (assessing the multi-factored "policy-driven" approach to duty as "arbitrary, inde-
terminate, and doctrinally unstable" and concluding that "lolur understanding of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of political institutions often leads to the conclusion that
the legislative and executive branches are more capable, or at least more appropriate,
institutions for making such decisions"). I would contend that categorical foreseeability
decisions are similarly suspect.
295 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
296 Id. at 340.
297 Id. at 343-45. Although the court stated that it was not necessary to "decide
whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect a potential victim of another's conduit," id. at 343, the court's analysis of the spe-
cial relationship between psychologist and patient turned in part on the fact that psy-
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In other words, just as a low incidence of class-foreseeability
might lead a court to deny the existence of a duty, a higher-than-
ordinary incidence of class-based foreseeability might be reason to
impose a duty of care where otherwise none would exist. 298 This con-
clusion implicitly stems from the following reasoning. In the ordinary
case, courts refuse to impose an affirmative duty to warn or protect
another from danger posed by a third source299—a rule generally un-
derstood to arise from courts' concern for individual liberty.") Where
a particular class of defendant has a higher-than-ordinary likelihood
of foreseeing a class of risk, injury, or plaintiff, the proportionately
greater opportunity for accident-prevention afforded by imposing an
affirmative duty may outweigh the countervailing liberty interests of
the defendant class. 301
Furthermore, unlike no-duty holdings based on categorical un-
foreseeability, the affirmative use of categorical foreseeability does not
forgo a context-specific foreseeability inquiry. Consider, for example,
if the Tarasoff court had held that a psychologist owes no duty because
chologists are uniquely privy, to knowledge of dangers posed by their clients. Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Many Faces of Forrseeability, 10 KAN. j.L. & l'UB. Pot.'v 156, 157-58 (2000).
291i See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1838-39 ("The ease or difficulty for per-
sons in the defendant's category to anticipate those harms is relevant to whether it makes
sense for such persons to be said to have a duty to be vigilant against causing them. Hence,
... the decision that certain defendants are particularly well-situated to foresee the sort of
harm that befell the plaintiff is not only relevant to whether there was a breach. It is also
relevant to whether a category of defendant may properly be declared to owe a duty of due
care to a category of plaintiff.").
299 PasTATEstENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); Dorms, supra note 2, § 314, at 853.
goo E.g., Epstein, supra note 117, at 197-98; see also RIPsl'EIN, supra note 113, at 91
("The fact that you are in peril, and I know of your peril, does not make that risk mine....
To shift risk in this way would be unduly burdensome to liberty . . .."); Arthur Ripstein,
The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FoRtniAtu L. Rev. 1811, 1840 (2004)
(explaining that defendants' nonfeasance does not typically generate a duty because "fals
private parties, they cannot be under any corresponding obligation to confer any benefit
on me, no matter how significant the benefit, and no matter how easy it is to confer. Such
an obligation would undermine the sense in which what they have is their own"). See gener-
a10 Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. Rev. 673 (1994) (offer-
ing a range of possible justifications).
501 In economic terms, suppose that courts would prevent 100,000 injuries a year, val-
ued at $100,000 each, by imposing on society generally a duty to protect, warn, or rescue.
By the absence of such a general affirmative duty, we might presume the conclusion that
society's combined interest in liberty is worth more than the combined value of 100,000
yearly injuries: (300,000,000 people x $100 yearly liberty interest per person =
$30,000,000,000) > (100,000 yearly injuries x $100,000 per injury = $10,000,000,000).
Suppose now that imposing an affirmative duty on 10,000 psychologists would prevent 100
injuries per year. The value of these 100 yearly injuries may well outweigh the combined
liberty interest of the psychologist class: (10,000 psychologists x $100 yearly liberty interest
per person = $1,000,000) < (100 yearly injuries x $100,000 per injury = $10,000,000).
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generally it is not foreseeable that a psychologist's patient may pose a
risk to a third party. In such a case, psychologists would escape liability
even where a jury might have found that the risk was indeed foresee-
able (or, as in Tarasoff, actually foreseen). As noted above, such a re-
sult would be nonsensical. A court's affirmative use of class-based
foreseeability does not elicit this problem, however. Although the Ta-
rasoff court imposed a duty based in part on the relatively high inci-
dence of psychologists' foresight, the jury remained free to deny li-
ability in the context of breach or proximate cause because the risk,
injury, or plaintiff was not foreseeable under the circumstances.
Despite the promise of categorical foreseeability, however, it
proves conceptually unstable. Specifically, the affirmative use of cate-
gorical foreseeability is at odds with the canonical distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. In deciding that a psychologist's special
ability to foresee is enough to override the general no-duty-to-rescue
rule (and its underlying principleS), it is difficult to argue that the
ability of others to foresee injury should not also be sufficient. For
example, suppose that a small stretch of public street outside a hab-
erdashery becomes icy due to a combination of inclement weather
and a peculiar dip in the road. Suppose also that the haberdasher
witnesses several accidents throughout the day and does nothing to
prevent them. The haberdasher is surely more likely than the ordi-
nary person to foresee the risk that passing cars might slide on the
ice—and yet the haberdasher will not owe a legal duty to warn those
in danger. The difference -between the psychologist and the haber-
dasher is not the incidence with which each might foresee the rele-
vant class of harms. Psychologists are surely no more privy to impend-
ing doom than is a class defined as "people who work in proximity to
an observed potential road hazard." With no greater potential for ac-
cident-prevention, the categorical foreseeability of psychologists pro-
vides no greater ballast against a countervailing liberty interest than
does the categorical foreseeability of the haberdasher. Indeed, along
this line, a few scholars have urged that the logical extension of Tam-
soff leads to abrogation of the traditional distinction between misfea-
sance and nonfeasance in favor of an approach to duty based almost
entirely on foreseeability.3°2
102
 John M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REY. 867,
911-14 (1991) (proposing the abandonment of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction
and suggesting that such a change is necessitated by the same forces that led to California
duty cases such as Tarasoff); Lake, supra note 4, at 121-23 (characterizing Tarasoffas having
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One might attempt to distinguish Tarasoff from the case of the
apathetic haberdasher according to the ease with which a court can
identify the psychologist class in advance. Such an assertion is not
necessarily accurate, however. Although it might be a relatively
straightforward inquiry for a court to evaluate psychologists' ability as
a class to discern a patient's potential for violence, the foreseeability-
related attributes of "business owners in proximity to potential road
hazards" or even more generally, "people who are witness to an obvi-
ous risk" seem at least as readily apparent. In addition, although ad-
ministrative inefficiency often rightly serves as a reason not to impose
a duty, 503
 the ease with which a court might identify a class is not so
clear a justification on its own to impose a duty. A court cannot nullify
the liberty interests of an entire class of defendants simply because it
is easier to identify those defendants than others—there must be
some underlying substantive reason to do so."4 Administrative ease in
such a case only has substantive content as compared to administra-
tive difficulty.
All of this is not, of course, to say that the Tarasoff court was wrong
to impose an affirmative duty on psychologists to warn third parties of
risks posed by patients. The court's decision might, for example, be
justified by a perceived need to stem a growing tide of injuries caused
by psychological patients. Or, as the Tarasoff court reasoned, the thera-
pist-patient relationship might be sufficiently custodial that the thera-
pist must protect the patient not only from harm but also from harm-
ing others. 505 The imposition of an affirmative duty cannot, however, be
justified by categorical foreseeability.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis of the
three subspecies of categorical foreseeability—the capacity to foresee,
strengthened the prominence of foreseeability in duty decisions); Murphy, supra note 4, at
175-76 (arguing that the duty analysis has gradually embraced a duty rule turning primar-
ily on an analysis of foreseeability, an evolution culminating in Tarasoff). Indeed, there can
be no doubt that Tarasoff has extended its influence beyond the realm of affirmative du-
ties. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,588-91 (Cal. 1997)
(applying Tarasoff factors, chief among which is foreseeability, to an action for negligent
misrepresentation—a misfeasance claim—in which a school recommended an ex-teacher
for hire despite its knowledge of past complaints of sexual misconduct).
3°3 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
so Such would be functionally equivalent to making theft a crime only for those with a
low IQ because such people are easier than others to catch.
305 See 551 P.2d at 344 ("nib,
 entering into a doctor-patient relationship the therapist
becomes sufficiently involved to assume some responsibility for the safety, not only of the
patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to be threatened by
the patient.').
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categorical unforeseeability, and categorical increased foreseeability-
is obviously unique among the subsections of Part. III of this article.
Rather than an argument that categorical foreseeability might fit
within breach or proximate cause instead of duty, I have urged that
categorical foreseeability is (1) normatively deficient, and/or (2) a
facade for some other duty-relevant determination. I now turn to a
more robust discussion of the latter as a distinct conceptual use for
foreseeability.
E. Foreseeability as Proxy
In a variety of types of cases, courts use foreseeability as a conven-
ient tool by which to limit liability in order to reflect community no-
tions of obligation or for reasons of policy. Properly understood, this
use of foreseeability is unproblematic. To the extent that a court im-
poses atypical boundaries on a jury's determination of foreseeability in
order to effect a policy-based limitation on liability, such a determina-
tion lies squarely within the province of the court to delineate the stan-
dard of care or to define the legal standard for proximate cause. It
would be a mistake, however, to characterize such holdings as "foresee-
ability decisions." Courts in such cases do not decide foreseeability at
all, but leave (or at least properly leave) the actual foreseeability deter-
mination to the jury. Instances of this conceptual use of foreseeability
may be found in cases alleging. emotional harm," 6 economic harm,"7
landowner-liability,"8 and other scenarios with regard to which a court
"6 See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (NJ. 1980) (limiting claims for by-
stander emotional distress, in relevant part, to cases in which the "plaintiff was located
near the scene of the accident" as least partly because "as physical proximity between
plaintiff and the scene of the accident becomes closer, the foreseeable likelihood that
plaintiff will suffer emotional distress from apprehending the physical harm of another
increases"). At least one court has gotten it right, however. See Gates v. Richardson, 719
13.2(1 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (deciding to impose a duty to avoid negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress and recognizing that foreseeability plays no role in such determination
while noting that "{i]nstead of perpetuating the illusion, we prefer to set forth the legal
duty and outline the policy principles which persuade us to recognize the legal duty and its
limitations").
"7 See, e.g., Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis.
1983) (explaining that, in a suit for economic harm, "'Mt is enough [to permit liability]
that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a particular
person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of persons, distinct from the much
larger class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to have access to the infor-
mation and foreseeably to take some action in reliance upon it'") (quoting RESTNFEM ENT
(SECOND) of TORT'S § 552, cent. h (1965)).
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wishes to limit liability in some at least ostensibly principled way. 309
Consider the following representative case.
In Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,310 the plaintiff sued Wal-Mart
after having been robbed in a Sam's Club parking lot. Mrs. Posecai
alleged that Wal-Mart was negligent for having failed to post a security
guard outside of its store. 311 Characterizing Mrs. Posecai's case as al-
leging violation of an affirmative duty, 312 the court summarized the
various approaches of state courts in analyzing the existence of a duty
on the part of a business owner to protect patrons from the crimes of
third parties.313 As the court explained, many courts have imposed
such a duty, limited in a variety of ways by foreseeability. 9" In some
jurisdictions, for example, a business owner owes a duty to protect
patrons only if "he is aware of specific, imminent harm about to befall
them."915 In others, a duty exists only in light of "evidence of previous
crimes on or near the premises." 316 In still others, the owner owes a
duty to protect customers against any harm that is foreseeable under a
"totality of the circumstances."317 Each test represents a balance be-
tween the security interest of customers and the liberty interest of
owners.318 Foreseeability is the means by which a court manifests the
balance chosen. If a court decides that the balance should favor the
business owner, it might impose liability only where crime is actually
368 See, e.g., Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926,928 (Mo. 1995) (describing the common-
law duty standard owed by landowners to invitees to protect against foreseeable conditions
and the duty to protect licensees only from conditions actually foreseen).
366 See, e.g., Lingle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301,1306 (Vt. 1986) (holding that a social host
has a duty of care only in situations in which the host 'furnishes alcoholic beverages to one
who is visibly intoxicated and it is foreseeable to the host that the guest will thereafter drive
an automobile").
31° 752 So. 2d 762,764 (La. 1999).
311 Id. at 765.
312 Id. at 766. Such a conclusion is not foregone, however. By choosing to run a busi-
ness in a potentially criminal neighborhood, perhaps Wal-Mart in fact created the risk of
harm and therefore owed a general duty to run its business reasonably safely—a standard
that might necessitate the posting of security guards.
313 Id. at 766-68.
314 Id. at 766.
313 Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 767,
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Cf. RiPSTE1N, supra note 113, at 50 (explaining the limited duty not to cause purely
economic harm—a duty which often turns on foreseeability—as follows: "Only some forms
of attachment to particular goods are protected; protecting all economic interests would
place too great a burden on the liberty of others. If I could not act unless I was sure that
your financial position would not be adversely affected, I could not act at all.") (footnote
omitted).
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foreseen. If a court is more sympathetic to the interests of customers,
the court may define foreseeability according to a totality of the cir-
cumstances. The test restricting foreseeability to evidence of prior
similar crimes represents a choice somewhere in between. 319
Defining the parameters of the foreseeability inquiry does not,
however, constitute the inquiry itself. Rather, it is a means of delineat-
ing the scope of a business owner's, duty. Pursuant to the typical negli-
gence standard of care—the duty to use reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances—a judgment regarding a business owner's reasonableness
would depend (in part) upon the degree to which crime on the prem-
ises of the business was foreseeable. The more foreseeable the risk of
crime, the more likely the conclusion that the defendant's failure to
account for it was wrongful. In cases , like Posecai, courts have altered this
standard of care, conditioning it on a particularized notion of foresee-
ability. In such cases, the defendant's reasonableness does not turn on
foreseeability unmodified but instead on whether the owner was actu-
ally aware of the crime or whether crime was foreseeable in the
cramped light of previous similar crimes. Delineating the standard of
care thus is undoubtedly a task for the court within the context of
duty. 32° The decision whether a defendant's conduct met that standard,
however—including the judgment regarding to what degree risk was
foreseeable, however foreseeability is defined—is the essence of the
jury's determination of breach. 321 Hence, the actual foreseeability de-
termination in cases such as Posecai properly is left to the jury.
Unfortunately, courts in such cases often adopt a different view of
foreseeability's role. Even if such courts agree that their various cali-
brations of foreseeability represent an attempt to strike an appropri-
ate balance between the relative interests of the parties, they often
view this exercise as part of their inquiry into duty's existence, not as
part of a delineation of the standard of care.322 The import of this per-
haps subtle distinction is clear. If narrowing the definition of foresee-
ability is a matter of setting the appropriate standard of care, then the
actual foreseeability determination is left to the jury. If, on the other
319 One might also conceptualize these duty decisions in terms of a court's appropriate
recognition of community-based notions of obligation between business owners and their
patrons. The variety of tests would embody courts' sundry impressions of such notions.
32° RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 32813 (1965).
321 See id. § 328C.
322 See, e• —.,g- Posccai, 752, So. 2d. at 765 ("The sole issue presented for our review is
whether Sam's owed a duty to protect Mrs. Posecai from the criminal acts of third parties
under the facts and circumstances of this case.").
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hand, the court conditions the very existence of a duty on foreseeabil-
ity, then the court has co-opted the foreseeability determination from
the jury. The court in Posecai took the latter approach,323 although
there is not uniformity among the courts in this regard. 324
In sum, Posecai and cases like it represent courts' attempt to limit
the liability of a class of defendants for a class of risk or injury not
based on categorical foreseeability (as described in the previous sub-
section), but due to a non-foreseeability-related policy reason. Al-
though a court might—as did the court in Posecai—thus choose to
limit liability by conditioning the existence of a duty on a limited form
of foreseeability, a court rnight also do so by redefining the standard
of care or the legal standard for proximate cause. The only practical
difference between the two approaches lies in whether the court or
the jury renders the ultimate foreseeability determination. The effec-
tiveness of foreseeability's use as a proxy thus need not depend on a
court's determination of foreseeability within the confines of duty.
IV. DUTY WITHOUT FORESEEABILITY: A CONCLUSION
AND A BEGINNING
In this Article, I have highlighted the shortcomings of an account
of duty that hinges upon determinations of foreseeability. I have also
attempted to show that each of foreseeability's conceptual functions
might instead operate wholly and seamlessly within the element of
breach or proximate cause or both (or, in the case of categorical fore-
seeability, that negligence law would benefit from its disavowal alto-
"3 See id. at 769 (concluding in light of all the evidence that "Sam's did not possess the
requisite degree of foreseeability for the imposition of a duty to provide security patrols in
its parking lot").
9"4 See, e.g., Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Mass.
1998). In Nycal Corp. u KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court
considered the viability of a third-party claim for pure economic loss resulting from al-
leged auditor malpractice. Id. at 1369. The court viewed the issue not as whether a duty
existed, but rather as what was "the scope of liability of an accountant to persons with
whom the accountant is not in privity." Id. at 1370. The court reviewed the various ap-
proaches taken by other courts, which ranged from allowing such claims pursuant to the
typical reasonableness standard to limiting claims, at least in part, by narrowly defining the
conditions under which injury to another might be found foreseeable. Id. at 1370-72.
After picking a test, the court upheld summary judgment for the defendants with apparent
deference to the jury's right, in the first instance, to determine foreseeability. Id. at 1373.
Although Nycal represents the intersection of a number of knotty negligence issues—in-
cluding a Palsgraflike duty/proximate cause issue and the always puzzling intersection of
tort and contract law—it is safe to say that the various approaches were necessitated by the
fact that courts are more hesitant to extend liability for purely economic loss.
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gether). It is my hope that the foregoing discussion will rekindle de-
bate regarding the more important question—whether the court or
the jury is the better institutional arbiter of foreseeability. This debate
might rage on many fronts—whether judge or jury is more accurate,
more just, more lawful, or more consistent, and perhaps at the center
of it all, whether the benefits of clear, ex ante rules outweigh the con-
cern for individualized justice.
Still, one question yet nags at my conscience—after all the dust of
my reconstruction of foreseeability settles, what is left of duty? One
might argue that even a flawed conception of duty is preferable to
one gutted of foreseeability, an empty shell of the element of duty as
many now understand it.
The basis for a foreseeability-free conception of duty is far from
revolutionary, however. It stems from the proposition that at its core,
duty consists of the following inquiry:
Assuming that the defendant's actions were unreasonable
and assuming that the plaintiff's injury was within the scope
of the risk that made the actor's conduct unreasonable,
should the court give legal force to an obligation on the part
of the defendant to have acted reasonably?
With regard to foreseeability specifically, this initial duty inquiry
might be translated, in relevant part, as follows:
Assuming that some risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable
and assuming that the plaintiff's injury in particular was rea-
sonably foreseeable, should the court give legal force to an
obligation on the part of the defendant reasonably to have
foreseen it?
Understood pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Part III above, this
general duty provision serves as a lens, filtering out questions that the
law has decided to leave to the jury, unless incontestable, and focusing
the duty inquiry instead on two prime considerations: (1) whether an
obligation exists within the broadly generalized class of circumstances
at issue and (2) whether courts should give legal cognizance to that
obligation.
Of course, this duty standard leaves the ultimate question unan-
swered—it offers little guidance to courts regarding how to recognize
an obligation or whether to gird an obligation with the force of law. It
is not within the purview of this Article to set forth a comprehensive
theory of how this ought to be done. My instinct is that duty is a com-
plex organism, which necessarily consists of a mix of the considera-
988	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 46:921
tions listed in Part LC above: community notions of obligation, a
broad sense of social policy, concern for the rule of law, and adminis-
trative capability and convenience. 525 Furthermore, I resist the view
that duty must exist either as a system of pure rule and principle or as
an ad hoc balancing of instrumental policy goals. 326 In my view, it is
both.
325 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
"6 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 19, at 76-77 (proposing that duty decisions are the result
of courts' balancing of the following "factors": administrative, ethical or moral, economic,
prophylactic or preventative, and justice); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 1739-43,
1819 (characterizing the view of justice Holmes and Prosser to be that duty amounts to little
more than a multi-factored 'policy-driven check on liability" and criticizing such an approach
because it (1) is unprincipled, (2) usurps the power of the legislature, (3) obscures the ra-
tionale for judicial decisions, and (4) fails to provide clear rules for society); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L,J . 467,
468 (1976) (urging that "under all the circumstances" tests for liability are potentially devoid
of meaning and incapable of supplying guidance). But see George C. Christie, The Uneasy Place
of Principle in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPIIICAL FOUNDATIONS OF Tour LAW, supra note 104, at 129
(suggesting, in the context of a discussion of the role of foreseeability in economic harm
cases, that "we have asked too much of principles. For the appeal of principles to be useful,
we must not only have more modest expectations of their role in the decision of tort cases
but also perhaps a more expansive notion of what comes within the ambit of a principle"). See
generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (offering a reconciliation of the leading instrumentalist
and non-instrumentalist understandings of tort law).
